incoming Liberal administration of 1906 had many problems to contend with. Soon
to be pledged to a programme of extensive social reform
and hopeful of a reduction in the onerous naval estimates they immediately saw
the former goal jeopardized by the prospect of a naval arms race created by the
launch of the revolutionary new battleship, Dreadnought.
Despite the Anglo-French entente, relations with Russia were still at a low ebb
following the infamous Dogger Bank incident of October 1904 when trigger-happy
Russian warships, on their way to reinforce the fleet in the war with Japan,
fired on British trawlers in the scarcely credible belief that they were
Japanese torpedo boats waiting in ambush. On the diplomatic front, the
Conference at Algeciras had just been convened following the First Moroccan
crisis which arose when, in March 1905, the Kaiser, grievously seasick in a
howling gale, thankfully descended on firm ground at Tangier to mutter a pledge
to uphold the independence of Morocco.
While the wind snatched his words and scattered their meaning amongst the
bemused onlookers, the significance of his appearance at the port was all too
apparent in Paris and London. This heavy-handed attempt to convince the French
that they would be wiser to co-operate with Germany, not England, had the
opposite effect to that intended. As a result of the threat of war with Germany,
secret Anglo-French military conversations commenced and were later sanctioned
by Grey, though this fact was withheld from most of the Cabinet. If, within
months, the European outlook showed signs of improvement, the defence of the
Empire, and the concomitant financial strain that this entailed, remained.
Following a dispute over the Turco-Egyptian frontier,
by the spring of 1906 the question of the defence of Egypt was beginning to push
to one side that of India in the discussions of the C.I.D. At the meeting on 6
July Grey was sufficiently surprised by the remarks of Sir John French, one of
the military representatives, as to warrant the latter preparing a secret
memorandum on A Turco-German Invasion of Egypt which succinctly set out the
European political situation as viewed by the military.
is known to be jealous of our maritime supremacy, and has adopted an attitude
generally hostile to our commercial and political interests. Turkey is entirely
alienated from us for reasons which are well known. These two Powers are
believed to be in close sympathy, the word and advice of Germany counting for a
great deal in the counsels of the Ottoman Empire. There is, in fact, something
very like a secret alliance between them, and all their interests in the Near
and Middle East are antagonistic to ours. France desires peace at almost any
price, and is unlikely to intervene in any quarrel in which she is not directly
interested. Russia may probably be regarded as a quantité
négligeable for some years to come. Austria-Hungary and Italy practically
neutralize one another.
French’s opinion, ‘Many German officers are at the present moment serving in
the Turkish army, and German influence is paramount…From the outset,
therefore, of any war between Turkey and ourselves I believe we may be certain
that, although at first the hand will be the hand of Turkey, the voice will be
the voice of Germany.’ It was also a cardinal feature of his memorandum that
French assumed ‘that the Dardanelles are effectually closed against the
enterprises of our fleet.’
French’s ideas did not meet with universal approval. Lord Cromer (who
considered the C.I.D. was not the proper forum to discuss strategical problems
founded on a political hypothesis) was quick to acknowledge that, ‘As regards
German aid to Turkey, I daresay there might be some truth in the ideas that have
been floating about in the political world for some while, to the effect that
some German politicians rather look forward to using Turkey as a cat’s-paw
with which to annoy us’; nevertheless, when he looked at
internal condition of Turkey, to the state of Arabia, to the general
unpreparedness of the Turks, to the vacillation of Turkish statesmen, to the
suspicions which are always engendered in their minds by the action even of
their European friends, to the remarkable capacity of the Turks for missing all
their opportunities, and for doing the wrong thing at the wrong time, it is, at
all events, not at all improbable that if the Germans attempt to carry out a
policy of this nature they would be deceived, and that the reed on which they
were leaning would pierce their own hand.
diatribe commanded respect in view of his long experience as Consul-General in
Egypt, and was not untypical of prevailing attitudes to Turkey. Indeed, although
Abdul Hamid had succeeded in entangling Germany in the Ottoman Empire, he was
never able to extract a guarantee for the territorial maintenance of his Empire
and refused to countenance the idea of a formal alliance which, to be attractive
to Berlin, required a strong army; and the Sultan, ‘despite his high military
spending and his commitments to army reform, saw a strong army as a threat to
his own position.’
The whole question of war with Turkey was set down for discussion in the
C.I.D. on 26 July 1906. As ever, that inveterate scribbler Lord Esher had
prepared his own memorandum before-hand and, jealous as always of the privileged
platform provided him by virtue of the Committee, it was no surprise that he
disagreed with Cromer’s views as to where the limits of C.I.D. inquiry should
be drawn. Besides, French’s ‘political hypothesis’ of a secret
understanding between Germany and Turkey which might possibly develop into an
open alliance was ‘a condition by no means unthinkable, and of which certain
members of the Committee have asserted that they possess good evidence. Sir John
French has himself vouched for the large number of German officers whom he saw
last year employed as instructors…’
When the meeting convened Grey began by pointing out immediately that any
attempt to discuss the issue raised by French of war with Turkey would be
difficult until a decision could be arrived at as to the current state of
thinking regarding the feasibility of forcing the Dardanelles. In this respect
the debate was hampered as, although the navy was represented at the Committee
by the ineffectual First Lord, Tweedmouth, and the new D.N.I., Captain Ottley,
the crucial figure of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, was absent.
Tweedmouth, following what he thought were Fisher’s views, explained that,
though not impossible by the Navy alone, the operation was fraught with great
risk and ‘it would be a costly proceeding, since the forts commanding the
Straits were now armed with powerful guns and the Turks had the assistance of
German artillery officers and men.’ Not only would ships inevitably be lost
but the expectation of these losses would necessitate a special vote in the Navy
Estimates, a remark Tweedmouth evidently believed would be sufficient to silence
his Liberal colleagues.
Ottley supported his First Lord by referring to previous discussions on
combined operations which, added to the experience of the combatants at Port
Arthur in the recent Russo-Japanese War, clearly demonstrated the superiority of
forts over ships. In the face of this onslaught only Cromer appeared to hold
firm: he ‘urged that the opinion of naval and military officers possessing
special local knowledge should be obtained with regard to the feasibility,
either as a naval or as a combined operation, of forcing the passage of the
Straits.’ What Cromer did not then divulge – the real reason for his seeking
the opinion of the man on the spot – was that the C-in-C, Mediterranean,
Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, had told him the passage of the Dardanelles was not difficult! When Fisher was made aware of this the following day
(after he received a report of the meeting from Ottley) the First Sea Lord went
immediately to Tweedmouth to point out that this was none of Beresford’s
business. ‘The most distinguished people advise freely when they have no
responsibility’, chided Fisher. Besides, the forcing of the Dardanelles was
now, Fisher argued, in the first place a military operation and ‘with the
altered condition of German supervision and German handling of the
Dardanelles’ defences, and German mines and German torpedoes, I agree with Sir
John French that we cannot repeat Sir Geoffrey Hornby’s passage [of which
Fisher was a participant]…and even if we get passage, there is the getting
back…But of course a reasoned argument will be got out to satisfy the Defence
Committee.’ Fisher would have to wait until the next meeting of the C.I.D. to
have his say.
Both French and Fisher had laid stress on how the extent of German
infiltration in Turkey had considerably altered the options available to the
British, either simply to exert pressure on the Porte or, more importantly, to
defend Egypt without resorting to French’s scenario of a large standing army.
In contrast, the private view from the Foreign Office ignored the Germans
altogether. The Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Charles Hardinge, had studied the
memoranda of French, Esher and Cromer and thought he knew better. ‘I quite
understand’, he informed Esher, ‘that the Admiralty would object to
attempting to force the Dardanelles, which could not be done without incurring
serious losses if the Turks know at all how to handle heavy guns. But as I know
the Dardanelles’ forts well both from the sea and from the Asiatic land side,
my conviction is that unless a lot of new forts have recently been created,
which is not very probable, the forts could be taken from rear by a force landed
at Besika Bay on the Asiatic Coast after the fort commanding the bay had been
destroyed by naval gunfire, a process which it would not be difficult to
This, in turn, contradicted the view of the Director of Military Operations,
General Grierson, who urged that the best method of forcing the passage would be
to capture the forts on the northern
coast by attacking them in the rear with troops landed on the Gallipoli
Peninsula! Nevertheless, it was the view of the Foreign Office which prevailed:
if thought necessary, an attempt to force the Dardanelles, even though it would
entail considerable losses, and whether accompanied by an expeditionary force or
not, might prove the surest method of defeating the Turks.
The next meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence was not until
November. By this time the position had changed once more: Fisher turned up this
time; Haldane, the War Minister, decided to voice a negative opinion; and
Grierson was absent
— his place being taken by Major-General John Ewart, who had set about
reorganizing the military intelligence divisions of the War Office, and who had
his own ideas concerning Turkey. Fisher set the tone by declaring that
‘Germany now controlled the Dardanelles, and we could no longer hope to bribe
the defenders into allowing us to pass unharmed through the Straits. He
hoped that no attack on the Dardanelles would ever be undertaken in any form.’
Esher did not go this far but declared that any attempt to force the passage
should be accompanied by military force. This raised the problem for Haldane
that a reverse suffered by troops landed in the Gallipoli Peninsula, of which
there would be a ‘grave risk’, would have a ‘serious effect on the
Mahommedan world’. He then went further: the loss of ships would also have a
deleterious effect and he thought some other means should be found of bringing
pressure to bear on Turkey, for example, by seizing some of the islands in the
Aegean. The new D.M.O., Ewart, adopted a position somewhere between Haldane and
Esher by advocating sudden attacks using troops from Malta supplemented by
landing parties from the fleet; surprise however had to be absolutely necessary
for this to succeed. That nothing was eventually decided was clear from the
hopelessly wide-ranging conclusion of Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister,
who summed up the three forms of attack available: naval action alone; or naval
action supplemented by a military coup de
main; or naval action accompanied by a military expedition on a large scale!
Yet, however vague, these options would remain the same in 1915 — a
devastating indictment of the poverty of war planning.
Campbell-Bannerman did however order a thorough investigation of the
subject to be made by the War Office and Admiralty. This report — The
possibility of a joint naval and military attack upon the Dardanelles
— was completed on 19 December 1906. The General Staff began by concurring
with the naval viewpoint ‘that unaided action by the fleet, bearing in mind
the risks involved, is much to be deprecated.’ Even if, the report added,
‘it were feasible to rush a number of His Majesty’s least valuable ships
past the batteries lining the Dardanelles and over the minefields which are
believed to exist in the channel, their arrival off Constantinople would be no
guarantee that the Sultan would be thereby brought to reason.’ Furthermore, if
in the worst scenario the squadron was destroyed, even though expendable, the
‘news would at once spread through the whole Mohameddan world that the British
Empire had experienced a serious humiliation’:
mere naval raid, therefore, into the Sea of Marmora being at once such a
dangerous and ineffective operation, it must be taken for granted that, if ever
an attempt to force the Dardanelles is made the work will have to be undertaken
by a Joint Naval and Military expedition having for its object the capture of
the Gallipoli Peninsula and the destruction of the forts…The General
Staff…fully accepts the Admiralty view that few operations of sea power in
combination with a modest land force promise to be more effective in their final
results than the seizure of the Dardanelles. The governing factor however, in
the consideration of any schemes of coercion in relation to the Turkish Empire,
is that success must be certain.
to achieve success would result in a general uprising throughout the Muslim
world. Yet for success to be assured the navy would have to guarantee that the
landing force should reach the shore unmolested, and that, once ashore, should
be free from hostile fire while they formed up; the General Staff doubted that
the Admiralty could give this absolute guarantee.
The General Staff was drawn to four conclusions: ‘ (1) that any policy
of hostility to the Turkish Empire would add greatly to our military
responsibilities in the East (2) that active military coercion of the Sultan,
with the forces at our disposal, involves risks which no Government should
lightly incur (3) that if pressure is to be exerted on the Porte, that pressure
should be political, except so far as the Navy is able to co-operate by
blockade, and by the seizure of islands (4) that the defence of Egypt, though
requiring careful consideration and study, gives at present no grounds for
concern.’ Captain Ottley, replying for the Naval Intelligence Department and
citing the example of a recent Japanese attack upon Russian positions, argued
that the General Staff was inclined to underrate the assistance which could be
rendered by heavy covering fire from naval vessels. Nonetheless, he still felt
that the attack could only be carried to a successful conclusion ‘provided the
Government of the day were prepared to utilize a sufficient force for the
purpose, and to incur heavy losses.’ Overall, Ottley maintained that, whereas
the General Staff appeared to regard the enterprise as too hazardous to be
attempted, the Naval Intelligence Department believed that there was ‘no
reason to despair of success, though at the expense, in all likelihood, of heavy
sacrifice’. Even so, as it was considered ‘inexpedient’ to have ‘any
document extant which indicated that coercion of Turkey was a matter of such
difficulty’, the invaluable General Staff report was quietly withdrawn, filed
away and forgotten — until 1915, when it was resurrected too late to influence
the course of events.
The relative positions of the War Office and Admiralty had therefore been
reversed, and it was no surprise, given the lack of consensus, that the C.I.D.
concluded, in February 1907, that ‘the operation of landing an expedition on
or near the Gallipoli Peninsula would involve great risk, and should not be
undertaken if other means of bringing pressure to bear on Turkey were
The knowledge that the most obvious means of coercing the Turks was to be
avoided if at all possible severely limited the options open to the Foreign
Office in their dealings with the Ottoman Empire. Having arrived at this
conclusion a sub-committee was formed at the behest of Lord Esher to investigate
alternative means of military coercion other than a Dardanelles expedition. The
sub-committee itself would not report until March 1909,
and then was more concerned with the defence of Egypt. For the meantime
intelligence gathered from within Turkey would be essential to form an opinion
on the relative objections of the War Office and Admiralty. Yet even in this
vital area planning was also being compromised – either by the amateur status
of the would-be agents or by their pre-conceived ideas – with the whole
situation then exacerbated by the dependence of the Military Attachés upon the
local Foreign Office officials for information. Of the War Office’s original
military intelligence sections (MO1–MO4, shortly to be expanded to include MO5
and MO6) MO2 dealt with the Ottoman Empire, in addition to Europe,
Austria-Hungary and Abyssinia! In the reorganization that followed, that part of
Arabia south of a line drawn from Aquaba to Basra was hived off, with a few
exclusions, to the Indian War Office and, to reflect the alteration, a report
was commissioned on Syria to replace the earlier one on Arabia. The bulk of the
report was based on the groundwork of the Military Attaché in Constantinople,
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Maunsell, who had been the consul at Van until his
transfer to the capital in 1901, but who had fallen out of favour by the end of
1905 and had been demoted to the Macedonian gendarmerie before retiring the
following year. At the Embassy in Constantinople Maunsell was on especially
close terms with Mark Sykes, an ‘honorary attaché’, who shared his views
regarding the defence capabilities of the Turks and the forces they could
utilize against Russian incursion and who was also in favour of curbing German
domination. Sykes took over the writing of intelligence reports after
Sykes’ companion honorary attachés in Constantinople included Aubrey
Herbert and George Lloyd, monied young men with a fascination for the East but
owing no particular allegiance to the Foreign Office or War Office, and lacking
training in either vocation.
While this might have seemed an admirable attribute, the lack of pre-conceived
ideas also made them susceptible to the wiles of the éminence
grise operating within the confines of the imposing if severe building atop
the hill in Pera — for they were attached to an embassy nominally under the
control of the Ambassador, Sir Nicolas O’Conor, but already subject to the
influence of the dragoman, Gerald Fitzmaurice.
O’Conor, a Roman Catholic Irish landlord, frail and languid (the latter
quality emphasized by deep blue eyes) had a genuine love of the Ottoman Empire
and had, since taking up the post in 1898, striven to improve relations between
Turkey and Britain. By 1906 though the 63-year-old Ambassador had grown tired of
his advice being disregarded and had allowed himself to become too closely
associated with Abdul Hamid.
O’Conor’s lassitude, which intensified after Grey took over the reins
at the Foreign Office, drove Sykes away from him. O’Conor believed that the
new Liberal Foreign Secretary could not do much damage to Anglo-Ottoman
relations, a belief not shared by Sykes who would return to England in 1907 to
contest a seat in Parliament as a Conservative. Sykes turned instead to
Fitzmaurice: like the Ambassador the dragoman was an Irish Catholic with intense
blue eyes who, being a good deal shorter, made up for this lack of stature by
sporting a large red moustache and by retaining a fiery emotion his weary boss
lacked. Fitzmaurice’s particular passion centred on his belief in a conspiracy
of Zionists and Freemasons busily plotting in Salonica the overthrow of Abdul
Hamid. Not that he was over-enamoured of the ageing Sultan: he wrote to Aubrey
Herbert (using the prevailing arachnoid imagery) that they were ‘all of us
grouped around the Grand Old Spider who unceasingly weaves cobwebs as meshes to
strangle the interests and prestige of the British Lion.’
Still, at least one knew where one stood with Abdul Hamid. Whatever benefits
might follow the overthrow of the Sultan’s regime were viewed as illusory or
ephemeral by Fitzmaurice who had fixed his colours firmly to the Hamidian mast,
for better or worse, which tended to blind him to the danger growing from within
the Empire against the regime.
In 1905 the future President of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, then a young army
officer, was, with his friend Ali Fuad, arrested and charged with plotting
against the regime; imprisoned for some months and then exiled to Damascus, Ali
Fuad was, a year later, posted to Salonica. It was an unfortunate choice:
Salonica contained the most rabid element of a growing movement of young
officers and reactionaries styling themselves the Committee of Union and
This nationalist grouping had emerged following a major split in the Ottoman
opposition movement in 1902. It was in June 1889 that a group of medical
students in Constantinople founded a secret society in opposition to the
Hamidian regime. Contact was later established with a similar movement of
liberal exiles in Paris, led by Ahmed Riza, who, in addition to their other
activities, produced a journal (La Jeune Turquie) from which the popular appellation ‘Young
Turks’ later derived. A second journal, openly smuggled into Turkey by the
agency of the foreign post offices, was subtitled ‘Order and Progress’.
Given the progressive aims of the movement, ‘Union’ (of all races) was
substituted for ‘Order’ and the Committee of Union and Progress was born.
The C.U.P. was, at first, neither the sole nor the most prominent of the various
factions opposed to the Sultan; however it rapidly attracted adherents who
recognized its growing strength even if they did not share all its aims.
By the autumn of 1896 the Committee was in a position to launch a coup
in Constantinople, which failed after the Palace had been alerted by an
informer. Following a prolonged crackdown by the authorities, the focus of
opposition moved to Paris, and it was here, in February 1902 that a major
conference was held to co-ordinate future opposition activities. The call for
such a congress was necessitated by the fact that, by this time, the C.U.P. had
become an umbrella organization for a loose grouping of factions. A leading
scholar of the Committee in this period
has identified five separate factions: Ahmed Riza’s group, which advocated the
return of the constitution in a parliamentary framework and no foreign
intervention; high ranking statesmen within the regime who proposed instead an
advisory council to the Sultan; the medical students, with no clear agenda; a
fourth group influenced by the anarchist movement; and, finally, a Balkan
network promoting a Turkish national ideology.
During the 1902 Congress the delegates split decisively over the question of
whether foreign intervention would be necessary to achieve their aims. This
division allowed the Turkish nationalists to assert themselves following a
hiatus, and it was this agenda which was adopted by the reactionaries in the
Third Army Corps in Macedonia.
Kemal himself would visit Salonica unofficially in 1906 to rally support
until, in June the following year, his request for a transfer to the Third Army
was, perhaps injudiciously, granted; however, by the time of his return, the
movement had gained both sufficient strength and enough forceful adherents to
push Kemal to the periphery. New men, such as Talaat Bey, a local postal
official, had come to the fore.
Given the passions aroused by the alleged injustices of the Ottoman rulers
against their Christian subjects in Macedonia, Salonica was an ideal spot at
which to foment and channel the revolution. Yet when, as a ‘punishment’ for
travelling too much and ignoring his chancellery duties, Aubrey Herbert was
assigned by O’Conor to keep the Butcher’s Book of Macedonia he had ‘been surprised to find that
many of the worst atrocities were committed by the Christians upon their own
This was certainly the view that filtered back to London.
the meantime, negotiations continued towards an Anglo-Russian agreement.
Initially the prohibition on Russian warships traversing the Straits suited
Britain well, but by 1903 the Defence Committee had decided that the strategic
disposition in the Mediterranean would not change even if Russia obtained free
egress. In the spring of the following year King Edward, on a visit to
Copenhagen, was introduced to Alexander Isvolsky, the Russian Minister there,
who broached the subject of an Anglo-Russian Entente. Asia, he argued, was big
enough for everyone and should not present a problem in coming to a
rapprochement: but what was the King’s attitude on the Straits? While
admitting that the principle of closure was not absolute and that it might be
possible to conceive a situation in which everybody would gain from opening the
Straits, the King nevertheless pleaded that British public opinion would not
allow of such a move yet.
Within months of this promising initiative however the Russian Baltic Fleet, on
its doomed voyage to annihilation in the Straits of Tsushima, had opened fire on
British trawlers in the Dogger Bank. The indignation following this incident put
paid to the easing of tension and resulted in a firm British veto on any attempt
to send the Russian Black Sea Fleet through the Straits to follow the course of
their Baltic brethren, for which, presumably, the Russian sailors offered up a
silent prayer of thanks to Lansdowne.
By 1906 the way was open once more for patient diplomacy to resume.
The Russo-Japanese war had ended; Grey had come to the Foreign Office seeking
better relations with Russia; and Alexander Isvolsky was now Minister for
Foreign Affairs. Isvolsky’s fixation with the Straits was not without reason
as virtually all Russia’s export trade went through the waterway
but while, in theory, it remained open to merchant ships at all times, this
rather depended on having either Turkey or Russia in charge at the Porte. The
prospect of German influence becoming paramount was viewed with alarm.
Previously, the prohibition on warships was not to Russia’s detriment, in view
of the chronically poor state of her Black Sea Fleet. This defensive posture had
begun to change in certain circles with the realization that, due to the
increased instability in the region ‘navigation through the Straits was
increasingly put at risk. The Straits might now be closed owing to a variety of
circumstances quite beyond Russia’s control.’ The only way to circumvent
this problem would be to have the Straits opened to Russian warships for the
protection of trade.
When, late in 1906, Hardinge informed the Russians that, in the question of the
Straits, ‘we should be glad to consider any proposals that Russia might
submit’, Isvolsky ‘beamed with pleasure’ and described the intimation as
‘a great evolution in our relations and a historical event.’
Grey, however, more cautious than his Permanent Under-Secretary, preferred not
to bring the Straits into what he termed ‘this Asiatic Agreement’. The fact
is, he declared,
if Asiatic things are settled favourably, the Russians will not have trouble
with us about the entrance to the Black Sea, but France at any rate must be
taken into our confidence before we take engagements, and we should expect
Russia’s support about some Egyptian and other kindred things in the Near
East, which matter to us and are important to us.
Grey had only recently been assured that the defence of Egypt gave no cause for
concern, its mention might have been no more than a bargaining ploy to seek the
maximum concession where it really mattered — on the Indian frontier. A
secondary motive was later outlined by Hardinge: ‘Russia’, he declared,
‘will inevitably be drawn into paying greater attention to her position in the
Near East & there she will constantly find herself in conflict with Germany
and not in opposition to us’.
Isvolsky was content to abide by Grey’s wishes, for he had other plans
stirring, plans which would lead eventually to a flawed attempt to reach a
separate agreement with Austria-Hungary.
four o’clock on the afternoon of 31 August 1907 the Anglo-Russian Convention,
regarded by Isvolsky as little more than a form of insurance, was signed at the
Russian Foreign Office. The following summer, to cement the relationship, King
Edward visited his cousin, the Tsar. On Saturday, 6 June 1908, the King and
Queen and Princess Victoria, accompanied by Hardinge, Arthur Nicolson, Sir John
French, Sir John Fisher and their entourage boarded the Victoria
& Albert and steamed out into a furious sea that rendered all on board
until, the following Tuesday, the anchor of the Royal Yacht clattered down ‘in
the small but tense roadstead of Reval.’ The significance of the meeting that
followed was not in what was said, nor even what was not said, but rather in
what it was thought was said! The business side, in the hands of Isvolsky and
Hardinge, was primarily confined to the question of the programme for Macedonian
reforms, while Hardinge wished to impress upon the Russian the need for his
country to be militarily strong in Europe.
Isvolsky, however, apparently came away from the celebrations with the
impression that he had obtained British support for his ambition to open the
Straits to Russian warships, whereas Hardinge probably did no more than make a
general comment that the Straits should be open to everybody.
For the hotheads of the Third Army Corps in Macedonia the portents were far more
ominous. Rebellion had been spreading throughout the army in the spring and the
C.U.P. had plans afoot for a revolution to begin on 1 September,
the anniversary of Abdul Hamid’s accession.
Unaware of the nature of the talks, news filtering through of the Reval meeting
was enough to convince the leaders of the C.U.P. that the dismemberment of the
Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers was about to commence.
The situation in Macedonia was now running out of control. The day after
the ending of festivities in Reval an attempt was made on the life of Nazim Bey,
the Commandant de Place (head of the
military police) of Salonica. Nazim was about to return to Constantinople,
presumably to report on the state of affairs in the region. While half of
Salonica society, enjoying the warm summer evening, gathered in the public
gardens to listen to an open air concert, a man dressed in the uniform of a
Turkish officer crept into the garden of Nazim’s house and peered through the
jalousie to see the Commandant seated with an adjutant. Raising his revolver,
the would-be assassin fired two shots; sensing something was amiss, Nazim moved
instantaneously and was spared.
But the attempt on his life resulted in a commission of inquiry being appointed
to investigate the condition of the Third Army Corps. The Commission arrived in
Salonica on 20 June and, before long, a popular young officer, Major Enver Bey
(who happened to be Nazim Bey’s brother-in-law) was implicated as a ringleader
of the revolutionary movement and was summoned to Constantinople ‘with all
sorts of promises of reward and advancement’. Wisely, Enver chose to disappear
instead, though news was soon received in Salonica that he was gathering
adherents to his cause — in this case deserters from the garrison of Tikvesh.
Enver had not been the first to raise the standard of revolt: he had been
preceded by Major Niazi Bey who had conducted a guerrilla campaign in the
vicinity of Monastir since fleeing from Resna on 3 July 1908, after he had been
uncovered as a C.U.P. activist.
Every passing day brought with it a new intake of recruits to the camps of Enver
and Niazi; virtually powerless, Abdul Hamid sent a senior commander to put down
the rebellion. The unfortunate Shemshi Pasha had no sooner sent the Sultan a
cable from the telegraph office at Monastir on 7 July to inform His Sublime
Majesty that he was successfully suppressing the rebellion when, emerging once
more into the harsh light of day, Shemshi fell to an assassin’s bullet.
Undeterred, Abdul Hamid dispatched another emissary to carry on the work of
Shemshi, but Marshal Osman Pasha fared little better for, shortly after his
arrival in Monastir, the new commander was fired at and ‘somewhat severely
The Committee initially chose the remote region of Okhrida as their
headquarters and it was no surprise when nearby Monastir became the first place
to proclaim the return of the 1876 Constitution for this was the primary aim of
the C.U.P. which was, to begin with, more in the nature of a conservative group
forced to act rather than an out-and-out revolutionary party. Indeed, one of
their first acts was to approach the British Consul in Monastir and announce
that a rebellion would soon take place, which was not directed against the
Christians, and to ascertain the attitude of the British to such an event.
Because of the popular appeal of its modest demands the movement could not be
contained in Monastir and soon reached Salonica where support against the regime
could always be counted upon. Frantic instructions were dispatched from
Constantinople to the Inspector-General of Macedonia, Hussein Hilmi Pasha, who,
facing ‘a difficult situation with both dignity and skill, sent long telegrams
representing the futility of attempting repression when every instrument of
force was in the possession of the other side.’
By 21 July the game was up for, on that day, the rebels cabled a demand to Abdul
Hamid: restore the Constitution or be deposed.
With little room to manoeuvre Abdul Hamid attempted to forestall the
inevitable by dismissing both his Grand Vizier, Ferid Pasha, and the Minister
for War on 22 July. In Ferid’s place, Said Pasha, who was known to be friendly
to the British, was appointed in the desperate hope of buying time and staving
off the reforms demanded. On that day most of the British Embassy staff were
enjoying the Turkish Lawn Tennis finals from where rumour reached them of a
The insurrection caught all the Constantinople embassies on the hop, but
particularly the British. O’Conor had died in office on 19 March 1908
and Hardinge had recommended his place be taken by Sir Gerard Lowther who would
not arrive until 30 July. In the interim the Chargé d’Affaires, George
Barclay, took over which allowed Fitzmaurice to strengthen his grip on the
affairs of the Embassy. After O’Conor’s death the dragoman had written
privately to Grey’s private secretary, William Tyrrell, outlining the problem
Lowther was likely to face:
the last few years our policy, if I may call it so, in Turkey has been, and for
some time to come will be, to attempt the impossible task of furthering our
commercial interests while pursuing a course (in Macedonia, Armenia, Turco-Persian
boundary etc.) which the Sultan interprets as pre-eminently hostile in aim and
tendency. These two lines are diametrically opposed and consequently
incompatible with one another. In a highly centralised theocracy like the
Sultanate and Caliphate combined, with its pre-economic conceptions, every big
trade &c. concession is regarded as an Imperial favour to be bestowed on the
seemingly friendly, a category in which, needless to say, we are not
included…One feels that the British Gov[ernmen]t whether Liberal or
Conservative must needs continue on its present course in Macedonia so that
until that embroglio works itself out any British Ambassador here must
necessarily find himself in the equivocal, if not impossible position of having
to goad the Sultan with the pinpricks of reform proposals while being expected
to score in the commercial line successes which are dependent on the Sultan’s
particular, Fitzmaurice had become deeply antagonistic to the proposed
Macedonian reforms which could not be reconciled with the continued exhortation
from London to obtain new commercial concessions, while also denying the Sultan
additional revenue by refusing to allow the custom dues to be increased.
Until the Macedonian tangle could be ‘unravelled’ Fitzmaurice maintained
that the new Ambassador should be ‘a man who is not in a hurry to make a
reputation, who is serious, level-headed, and sympathetic and who is
consequently likely to impress the Sultan and inspire him with personal
confidence.’ It remained to be seen whether Lowther would fit the bill.
Meanwhile, on 23 July, at a prolonged Council of Ministers at the Palace,
Abdul Hamid’s first instinct was to try to repress the constitutional
movement; from this course he was eventually dissuaded: ‘It must have indeed
appeared incomprehensible to His Majesty that, with the immense army he had
always maintained, a handful of rebels could not be suppressed.’
The question then arose of some reform short of the restoration of the
constitution. When convinced by his more senior ministers, including the new
Grand Vizier, Said Pasha, that the time for such transparent gestures had
passed, Abdul Hamid ‘declared himself against half-measures, and decided to
re-establish the Constitution, which he said he had himself granted, and which
had never been abrogated.’
Early next morning, 24 July, a ‘short and inconspicuous’ paragraph appeared
in the press that the Sultan had decided to convoke Parliament.
Ever the political pragmatist, Abdul Hamid maintained that his suspension of
parliament in 1878 was never intended to be permanent but was a temporary
measure (albeit one that had lasted 30 years) necessary to enable him to push
through his programme of modernization.
And, cashing in on his temporary popularity, the Palace was thrown open to the
people on Sunday, 26 July, 60,000 of whom came to honour the deliverer of the
The coup had been, to general surprise, bloodless. When it became
apparent in Salonica that the C.U.P. had achieved its aim Enver, who had
returned the hero ‘escorted by a regiment of artillery and two hundred
decorated carriages’, climbed on to a table in the hall of the Salonica Club
on the afternoon of 25 July and delivered a ‘very modest and manly speech’
in which he declared that ‘he offered his life as a sacrifice to the cause of
the nation, and the Almighty had been pleased to restore it to him.’
All of this posed something of a problem for Mr Barclay, the stopgap British
Minister in Constantinople, who wanted to know ‘what was this C.U.P., of which
people were beginning to talk.’
Indeed, the Foreign Office obtained more information on the C.U.P. from the
British Embassy in Paris than from Constantinople!
After being so badly caught out, Barclay had to act quickly to retrieve the
situation and, by 26 July, was writing Grey: ‘It would be rash at this early
date to hazard any predictions as to the consequences likely to follow the
success achieved by the Young Turkish party, but at least it may be said that
the reform which is today the subject of such general rejoicing has a better
chance of proving a reality than any of the reforms granted by Abdul Hamid in
All in all, confided Hardinge in London, it was a ‘splendid opportunity for
Sir Gerard Lowther to arrive at Constantinople’ presaging perhaps a complete
reversal of British policy towards Turkey. While concerned that the Russians
should not revert to the intrigues of 1876 to upset the constitution Hardinge
added, ‘I can only hope that the Young Turk movement has a permanent basis,
and that it may perhaps be a bulwark to the new Constitution. Unless this is so,
I cannot help feeling that the Sultan will not accept the present situation, but
he will endeavour to upset it on the first possible occasion. In this course he
would no doubt be encouraged by Germany, since that Power cannot feel at all
pleased at the blow her influence will receive in Constantinople.’
As predicted, Lowther did receive an enthusiastic reception when he arrived on
30 July: the horses were unharnessed from his carriage and cheering Turks
instead provided the motive power to pull the new Ambassador up the steep hill
to the Embassy in Pera.
The antediluvian city had become vibrant, radiant, as, from the humblest to the
most exalted, the inhabitants were swept by a wave of profound excitement and
anticipation. It seemed as if a new era in Anglo-Turkish relations was about to
The proud confident expectation of that time induced a momentary
suspension of belief. Hardinge’s hope that damage might be inflicted upon the
German position was not realized as the Germans, themselves, in turn quickly
perceived the anomalous position in which the British were placed, after the
conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, by their support of the anti-Russian
Grey was certainly aware that a new complication had arisen: ‘we have now to
be pro-Turkish’, he minuted, ‘without giving rise to any suspicion that we
The Foreign Secretary subsequently expanded on this aspect: ‘We were in favour
of the new régime in Turkey,’ he informed Isvolsky, ‘not in order that we
might support Turkey against Russia, but because we regarded an independent and
well-governed Turkey as the only alternative to anarchy and confusion.’
Grey could also have mentioned that, however despicable Abdul Hamid’s
autocratic regime was, it also acted as a strong and necessary bulwark against
the competing Balkan interests of Austria and Russia.
Similarly, despite his public pronouncements, which tended invariably to be
sympathetic to the new regime, it is clear that Grey harboured grave misgivings
regarding the possible restitution of the Constitution. On the day after
Lowther’s triumphant arrival, Grey penned his instructions to the new
Ambassador, highlighting the problems that might ensue for the control of the
British Empire’s Muslim subjects consequent upon a successful reform movement
in the spiritual centre of Islam:
You have reached Constantinople at a most favourable and interesting
moment. How little we either of us foresaw, when you were appointed, the
reception you would actually get!
The telegrams and my speech in Parliament will have explained to you my
attitude. We should avoid making the Turks suspicious by attempting to take a
hand where we are not wanted: but we should make them understand that, if they
are really going to make a good job of their own affairs, our encouragement and
support will be very firm, and that we shall deprecate any interference from
outside on the part of others. I do not mean that we should go to the length of
intervention to protect them; but that our diplomatic attitude will be
benevolent, and our influence used to secure a fair chance for them.
Of course, things cannot continue going on as well as they are at
present, and it is impossible to say what troubles there may be before us. But
we must make it clear that our quarrels have been, not with the Turkish people,
but with the government of creatures against whom the Turks themselves have now
If Turkey really establishes a Constitution, and keeps it on its feet,
and becomes strong herself, the consequences will reach further than any of us
can yet foresee. The effect in Egypt will be tremendous, and will make itself
felt in India. Hitherto, wherever we have had Mahometan subjects, we have been
able to tell them that the subjects in the countries ruled by the head of their
religion were under a despotism which was not a benevolent one; while our
Mahometan subjects were under a despotism which was benevolent. Those Mahometans,
who have had any opportunity of comparing the conditions of Mahometans ruled by
the Sultan and the conditions of those ruled by us, have generally been ready to
admit the difference in our favour. But if Turkey now establishes a Parliament
and improves her Government, the demand for a Constitution in Egypt will gain
great force, and our power of resisting the demand will be very much diminished.
If, when there is a Turkish Constitution in good working order and things are
going well in Turkey, we are engaged in suppressing by force and shooting a
rising in Egypt of people who demand a Constitution too, the position will be
very awkward. It would never do for us to get into conflict on the subject of
Egypt, not with the Turkish Government, but with the feeling of the Turkish
I give this as only one of the matters which will require careful
handling, some time sooner or later.
Meanwhile, as regards Turkey herself, our course is clear: we must be
ready to help the better elements, to wait upon events, and give sympathy and
encouragement when required to the reform movement …Please send me your views
quite freely, and give me any suggestions and advice which you may think wise.
replied immediately, wanting to know what language he should use if the Khedive
of Egypt was so thoughtless as to touch on the question of the granting of the
To this, Grey replied cautioning Lowther to ‘say as little as possible to the
Khedive about a constitution for Egypt. If Turkey settles down to a free and
enlightened Government, it must have a great effect in Egypt and upon our policy
there. But for the moment all we can say is that we want to see what is going to
happen in Turkey and that the development of representative institutions in
Egypt will continue to receive constant consideration.’
However, when ‘some enthusiastic Nationalists’ arrived in Constantinople
from Egypt ‘clamouring for help and support’ not only were they met with no
encouragement, they were soundly lectured on how good their lot was: ‘They
were told that they were not suffering from corrupt administration; since they
had been under British tutelage their resources had not been squandered or their
people oppressed, they had enjoyed civil liberties, and had been raised to a
condition of prosperity and security unknown before. The emissaries… were
practically forbidden to give vent to the ideas here…’
As for the prospect of now working with an enlightened Turkish
administration Grey, himself, remained inclined to believe that it was all too
good to be true. As he informed Lowther:
What has happened already in Turkey is so marvellous that I suppose it is
not impossible that she will establish a Constitution, but it may well be that
the habit of vicious and corrupt government will be too strong for reform and
that animosities of race and religion will again produce violence and disorder.
Or out of the present upheaval there may be evolved a strong and efficient
military despotism. The effect upon the politics of Europe of a strong and
reformed Turkey would be very great. But it is too soon to speculate upon these
For the moment good influences seem to be uppermost, the dislike of the
old régime and the desire for something better are strong, the rejoicing at the
upset of the old and the prospect of a new régime is genuine; our course is
clear; we must welcome and encourage this prospect as long as it continues. But
we must be careful not to give Russia the impression that we are reverting to
the old policy of supporting Turkey as a barrier against her and should continue
to show willingness to work with Russia when possible.
least Lowther, presumably tutored by Fitzmaurice, saw one positive aspect: there
would be great openings for British business. ‘There seems no reason’, he
predicted, ‘why their finances should not very easily be put right. And they
will surely want to buy ships.’
After a quiet legislative year in 1906, dominated by the Education
Bill, the following year was much more productive. In particular,
Asquith’s 1907 Budget foreshadowed the introduction of the old age
Douglas Porch, The Conquest of Morocco, p. 137.
The ‘Tabah’ incident resulted after the occupation of this port
by Turkish troops. Thus emboldened, the Sultan sought to claim control over
the Sinai Peninsula, before eventually being forced to back down on 13 May.
Gooch, The Plans of War, pp.
Sir John French, A Turco-German Invasion of Egypt, 16 July 1906, PRO Cab 38/12/42.
Remarks by Lord Cromer on Sir John French’s memorandum, 23 July
1906, PRO Cab 38/12/44. Cromer had rather missed the point that French was
considering a theoretical situation some years hence.
Feroz Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire”, in Kent (ed.), The
Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, p. 12. Feroz Ahmad also
notes the comment of the German General von der Goltz who stated, after the
Balkan War, that while the Ottoman Empire had such vast borders and so many
enemies no power would wish to form an alliance with it.
A Turco-German Invasion of Egypt, memorandum by Lord Esher, 24 July
1906, PRO Cab 38/12/45.
Committee of Imperial Defence, minutes of the 92nd meeting, 26 July
1906, PRO Cab 38/12/46; Ottley to Fisher, 26 July 1906, Fisher to Tweedmouth,
27 July 1906, F.G.D.N., vol. II,
pp. 84-5. The question of the Baghdad Railway was also discussed that July:
although Grey thought it desirable that the line should be
‘internationalized’ and that Britain should construct and manage the
section south of Baghdad, he ‘did not think that we could take any steps
towards participation…unless the Germans approached us in the matter’
— which the German Government appeared reluctant to do, despite the fact
that ‘their financiers had been active.’ Grey then suggested that, if it
came down to a question of raising money in Britain, ‘the Government
should treat the undertaking in a similar manner to the Suez Canal and take
up the necessary shares.’ Overall, the Committee decided it was ‘most
undesirable’ – both militarily and commercially – to have the railway
completed and controlled by a foreign Power and that the best arrangement
would be to have the Baghdad-Persian Gulf section under a British manager
‘subject to the general control of an international Board.’
Hardinge to Esher, 26 July 1906, Esher, Journals
and Letters, vol. II, p. 172.
As John Gooch has noted, this conclusion was subsequently removed
from the C.I.D. papers, but has survived in War Office records. Gooch, The
Plans of War, p. 257 and note 75.
Grierson had, in effect, been sacked as a punishment for instigating
staff talks with the French General Staff without authorization: see,
Andrews, Secret Service, p. 32.
Committee of Imperial Defence, minutes of the 93rd meeting, 13
November 1906, PRO Cab 38/12/55 [my emphasis]. As a result of this meeting
the conclusion from the July meeting was expunged.
The possibility of a joint naval and military attack upon the
Dardanelles, 19 December 1906, PRO Cab 38/12/60 [given in full in appendix].
Although signed by General Sir Neville Lyttleton, the Chief of the General
Staff, the report’s author was in fact Charles Callwell. Denis Winter, 25
April 1915, appears to suggest that this report is missing and refers to
a copy which is accessible in the Bush papers at the Imperial War Museum;
part of this confusion could be because he has wrongly dated the report to
1907. Although the report was withdrawn from circulation shortly after being
issued, as the reference above indicates, the report can be viewed at the
Public Record Office. Winter has also confused Major L. L. R. Samson, a
military consul before the War who went on to head the British Secret
Service in Athens in 1914, with Wing Commander Charles R. Samson, who
commanded no. 3 wing, Royal Naval Air Service at the Dardanelles in 1915.
Note by M. P. A. Hankey, 24 February 1915, PRO Cab 38/12/60. See
chapter 26, below.
Minutes of the 96th Meeting, Committee of Imperial Defence, 28
February 1907, PRO Cab 38 13/12.
Report of a Sub-Committee on the Military Requirements of the Empire
as affected by Egypt and the Sudan. PRO Cab 38 15/5. See also Gooch, The
Plans of War, chapter 8 passim.
Winstone, Illicit Adventure,
pp. 7-8; Roger Adelson, Mark Sykes:
Portrait of an Amateur, p. 111.
Lloyd, in particular, was scathing about the new Liberal Government;
see, Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the
decline of the British Empire, p. 14.
Sir Andrew Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans, p. 15: ‘The word “dragoman” is one
of the many European corruptions of the Arabic word for translator or
interpreter. In the old days in Turkey it applied equally to the modest
guides who helped travellers and to persons employed by the foreign
diplomatic missions and consulates in the conduct of their business with the
Turkish authorities. These, if primarily needed for their linguistic
qualifications, were, in fact, much more than interpreters. They were
honest, or, as their enemies averred, dishonest brokers between the foreign
representatives and the Turks for a great variety of purposes. The system
was inextricably bound up with the operation of the Capitulations.’
Adelson, Mark Sykes, p.
110; Margaret Fitzherbert, The Man Who
was Greenmantle, p. 48.
Quoted in, Fitzherbert, Greenmantle, p. 71. Abdul Hamid shared the dragoman’s unease —
the rabble in Salonica was, he knew, ‘affiliated to the Masonic Order of
the Grand Orient, and maintained two flourishing Lodges…’ F Yeats-Brown,
Golden Horn, p. 12.
Gwynne Dyer, The Origins of the “Nationalist” Group of Officers in Turkey,
1908-18, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 8, no. 4, (1973), pp.
M. Sukru Hanioglu’s recent The
Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford University Press, 1995) is an
excellent in-depth study of the various opposition movements and the
Committee of Union and Progress in the period 1889 to 1902.
Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. II, p. 265.
Fitzherbert, Greenmantle, p. 52. In 1906 the population of Macedonia comprised:
1,145,849 Muslims; 623,197 Greek Orthodox; 626,715 Bulgarian Orthodox; and
59, 564 others: see, Shaw and
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire,
vol. II, p. 208, table 3.4.
See, for example, Grey’s memorandum on Turkey, January 1908, in
Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage of Power,
vol. III. pp. 461-4: ‘…Armed bands of Greeks, Bulgarians and Servians
are all killing each other and the unarmed population. There are a certain
number of outrages by Mussulmans upon Christians, and vice versa; but the
greatest evil in the country is the outrages of Greeks, Bulgarians and
Servians upon each other…’
Salisbury had in fact commenced negotiations in 1898 and ‘for the
purpose of obtaining it was prepared to make sacrifices which made
Curzon’s hair stand on end’ (which would have made for an alarming
sight) though nothing came of it. Sanderson to Spring Rice, 6 August 1907,
Spring Rice mss., PRO FO 800/241.
William Langer, Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8,
English Historical Review, vol. 44, (1929), pp. 64-5.
Conversely, the Japanese Government later admitted that ‘had the
Black Sea Fleet been in a position to join that of Admiral Rojdestvensky,
the consequences might have been very serious for Japan.’ Sir C. MacDonald
to Sir Edward Grey, No. 280, 25 October 1908, BD, V, No. 403, pp 463-4.
Neilson, Britain and the Last
Tsar, chapter 9, passim.
At the time 10,000 ships cleared Constantinople annually and tonnage
had risen 50% in 13 years to 15 million tons in 1904, only slightly less
than the tonnage passing through Suez. Langer, Russia,
the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8, p. 64.
Alan Bodger, “Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, in Kent
(ed.), The Great Powers and the End of
the Ottoman Empire, p. 82.
Grey to Nicolson, 1 April 1907, given in Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage
of Power, vol. III, p. 460.
Hardinge to Nicolson, 25 November 1907, Nicolson mss., PRO FO
Fisher wrote mockingly to his wife the following day: ‘I did wish
myself on dry land yesterday! I look with horror to the trip back across the
North Sea and would like to come back by train.’ F.G.D.N.,
Vol. II, pp. 180-1.
The Persian Question also entailed ‘considerable discussion’.
See, Memorandum by Sir Charles Hardinge, 12 June 1908, BD, V, no. 195, pp.
237-45; D W Sweet and R T B Langhorne, “Great Britain and Russia”,
1907-1914, in F H Hinsley (ed.), British
Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, pp. 244-5.
Nicolson, Lord Carnock, p.
273, note 1. Hardinge’s memorandum makes reference to the fact that ‘it
would remain a cardinal principle of Russian policy to keep the Straits
between the Baltic and the North Sea open’, but does not refer to the
Bosphorus or Dardanelles.
Fitzmaurice to Tyrrell, private, 25 August 1908, BD, V, no. 210, pp.
Another date favoured was 27 September, the Sultan’s birthday. See,
Annual Report for Turkey for 1908, BD, V, p. 249.
Annual Report for Turkey for 1908, BD, V, p. 249.
The assassin escaped, after firing at the adjutant and another
soldier who gave chase.
Niazi also made off with his battalion funds to help finance the
Osman Pasha was later kidnapped. Annual Report for Turkey for 1908,
BD, V, pp. 249-50, 287-9; Shaw and Shaw, History
of the Ottoman Empire, vol. II, pp. 266-7; Sir Edwin Pears, Forty
Years in Constantinople, (London, 1916), pp. 253-5; Wilfred Blunt, My
Diaries, 1888-1914, (2 vols., London, 1919-20), vol. II, p. 216, entry
for 27 July 1908; F Yeats-Brown, Golden
Horn, pp. 23-5.
Annual Report for Turkey for 1908, BD, V, p. 250.
Consul-General Lamb to Mr Barclay, no. 96, Salonica, 26 July 1908,
PRO Cab 37/95/118. Received in London on 10 August enclosed with Sir Gerard
Lowther’s dispatch no. 447 of 4 August 1908.
Ryan, Last of the Dragomans,
p. 52; Cunningham, The Wrong Horse,
p. 67; F Yeats-Brown, Golden Horn,
At his express wish, O’Conor was buried in the British Cemetery at
Scutari. Annual Report for Turkey for 1908, BD, V, pp. 248-9.
Fitzmaurice to Tyrrell, 12 April 1908, BD, V, no. 196, pp. 247-8.
Fitzmaurice characterized Britain’s Macedonian policy as ‘insane’.
Fitzmaurice to Tyrrell, 25 August 1908, BD, V, no. 210, pp. 268-70. See
also: Marian Kent, “Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire,
1900-23”, in Kent (ed.), The Great
Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, p. 178; Marian Kent,
“Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey, 1905-1914”,
in Hinsley, op. cit., p. 148;
Joseph Heller, British Policy towards
the Ottoman Empire, (London, 1983), p. 4.
Fitzmaurice to Tyrrell, 12 April 1908, BD, V, no. 196, pp. 247-8.
Annual Report for Turkey for 1908, BD, V, p. 250.
Barclay to Grey, no. 419, 26 July 1908, PRO Cab 37/95/118.
Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 267.
F Yeats-Brown, Golden Horn, p. 35. Lowther’s subsequent comment was succinct:
‘I thought, that the Sultan, the greatest of living Comedians, was unique
when he posed before the crowds as the simple and loving father of his
people who for 40 years had been deceived by his advisers as to their real
wishes.’ Lowther to Grey, private, 4 August 1908, BD, V, no. 205, pp.
Consul Lamb to Barclay, 26 July 1908, PRO Cab 37/95/118; F Yeats-Brown,
Golden Horn, p. 37.
Grey to Lowther, private, 31 July 1908, BD, V, no. 204, pp. 263-4.
Note: Marian Kent, Constantinople and
Asiatic Turkey, Hinsley, op. cit., p. 149, quotes part of this dispatch
but omits Grey’s concern regarding the Constitution.
Lowther to Grey, private, 4 August 1908, BD, V, no. 205, pp. 264-5.
Grey to Lowther, private, 11 August 1908, BD, V, no. 214, p. 309.
Annual Report for Turkey for 1908, BD, V, p. 257.
Grey to Lowther, private, 11 August 1908, BD, V, no. 207, p. 266.
Lowther to Grey, private, 11 August 1908, BD, V, no. 206, pp. 265-6.
Grey was not entirely convinced: ‘I was distressed to find when I came
into office’, he replied, ‘how completely we had been ousted from
commercial enterprises in Turkey and how apparently hopeless it was to get
any footing there. That was why I encouraged co-operation with the French;
it seemed as if British enterprise by itself had no prospect. Since then I
have been disappointed to find what a very poor set of financiers had got
commercial enterprise in Turkey into their hands. It was, I suppose,
inevitable under the old regime, for its methods were such that it did not
attract the best class of financier.’ Grey to Lowther, private, 23 August
1908, BD, V, no. 208, pp. 266-7.
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