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Superior Force : Table
of Contents |
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PART I |
THE ESCAPE |
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Introduction
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1 |
Mediterranean Meanderings |
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The British
position in the Mediterranean—Fisher’s preference for the battle
cruiser—the Anglo-French naval talks—the plan to evacuate the
Mediterranean—a compromise is reached—the
Mittelmeerdivision—Admiral Souchon—preparations for war—Goeben
and Breslau rendezvous at
Messina—the British Mediterranean Squadron—Admiral Milne —Inflexible visits Constantinople—the slow awareness of the gathering
storm—Rear-Admiral Troubridge and the First Cruiser Squadron—events at
Durazzo. | |
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2 |
Opening Moves |
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Milne regroups his forces—the
Admiralty ponders whether to reinforce the Mediterranean —the “superior
force” telegram—Italian neutrality likely—the Admiralty ponders whether
to denude the Mediterranean—Sailing Orders—Troubridge’s opinion of a
superior force —a misunderstanding—Grey’s chickens come home to
roost—the moral commitment to France—the Cabinet debates—the assurance
to Cambon—Milne’s efforts to contact the French—Admiral Lapeyrère has
second thoughts. | |
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3 |
The First Shot |
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Souchon makes his plans—a change
of heart in Berlin—Souchon holds to his intention— the opening
bombardment—Troubridge’s dispositions—Battenberg looks to the west— the
French set sail at last—a missed opportunity?—the chance
meeting—Churchill jumps the gun—a voluntary supererogation—chaos in the
War Room—the failure of the War Staff. | |
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4 |
The Chase Begins |
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Souchon’s limited options—more
speed—the British ships are found wanting—Captain Kennedy has a plan but
is over-ruled—Milne effects a concentration—Troubridge’s anomalous
position—Captain Kennedy is sent to Bizerta—Souchon returns to Messina—
the problems of coaling—startling news from Constantinople—the dilemma
of Admiral Haus—Souchon frames his sailing orders. | |
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5 |
The Break-out |
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The German ships are
located—further misunderstandings—Troubridge’s premature sortie—the
conflicting analyses of Milne and Troubridge—a fiasco in Bizerta—Milne’s
idée
fixe—Souchon steers east—Milne returns to Malta—the Italian
prohibition—
Gloucester
takes up the chase—Dublin
misses her chance. | |
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6 |
Admiral Troubridge Changes His Mind |
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Troubridge’s dilemma—no coal for
the destroyers—his intentions known—a plan is formulated—Troubridge
holds his course initially—the decision to engage—the puzzle of the
Austrian fleet—the torment of Admiral Troubridge—the intervention of his
Flag Captain—Troubridge abandons the attempt—Milne’s reaction. | |
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7 |
The War That Was Cancelled |
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Some clues as to Troubridge’s
state of mind—Gloucester continues the chase alone—
contact is lost—Milne returns to Malta—the puzzle – what are Souchon’s
intentions?— the recall of
Gloucester – Milne is called to account—the anomalous position of
Austria —the strange case of the punctilious Admiralty clerk—confusion
over signals—an unwarranted assumption—where was Churchill?—a final
chance—intelligence is received —who is “Metriticicas”?—Milne’s
doubts—reliable information? | |
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8 |
Souchon Arrives! |
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Souchon rests his crews, then
coals—positive news from Constantinople—Milne flounders—what did the
Admiralty know?—Milne’s options—Goeben
and Breslau reach the Dardanelles—a
dubious transaction is announced. | |
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PART
II |
THE GREEK CONNEXION | |
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9 |
Mark Kerr and the Balkan Background |
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Mark Kerr, an untypical
officer—his association with Battenberg—unorthodox ideas—an opportunity
presents itself—friends in high places—Kerr appointed C-in-C of the
Greek Navy—Kerr and the King—the influence of Germany—an unusual
request—Kerr’s advice ignored—the Greek naval build-up—Balkan
tensions—the formation of the Balkan League—the Balkan Wars—Greece
victorious at sea—Wilhelm plays a lone hand— Greece and Turkey take
matters into their own hands. | |
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10 |
The Battleship Summer |
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The Aegean naval race—the Turks
buy a dreadnought—Greece desperately seeks ships— conflict between
Greece and Turkey appears inevitable—Minister and Ambassador come home
on leave—a poor deal in America—fears that war would result in the
closure of the Straits—Venizelos’ bluff—stalling for time—a meeting with
the Turks—the greater conflict intervenes—Venizelos discovers a
let-out—Germany woos and wins Turkey. | |
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11 |
The Nocturnal Aberration of Eleutherios
Venizelos |
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Constantine plumps for
neutrality—Wilhelm’s furious reaction—the German threat—the destination
of the German ships revealed—Kerr’s knowledge of this—a circuitous
route— the mystery of Syra—Venizelos is less than forthright—coal for
Souchon—Venizelos seeks retrospective approval—his motives. | |
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12 |
The Case Against Kerr |
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The atmosphere in Athens—Compton
Mackenzie and the campaign of disinformation— how much did Kerr
know?—was Kerr deliberately planted?—his association with the Kaiser—did
the plan backfire?—the perils of informal networks—Kerr tries to be too
clever—his post-war reticence. | |
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13 |
The Sweeping Offer |
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Venizelos’ confederation
scheme—an enthusiastic response—Venizelos wants more—an approach to
Russia—a difference of opinion in the Foreign Office—the problem of
Bulgaria—Sazonov more concerned about Turkey—this concern mirrored in
London— the clash between Venizelos and his Foreign Minister—a sweeping
offer—a disappointing reply—Venizelos plays for time—the talks with
Turkey reconvened—Talaat’s ulterior motive—a bribe to Bulgaria?—the
return of Sir Francis Elliot—Sazonov takes the bait— the question of
action against Turkey—the report of the Military Attaché—Churchill
intervenes—the prospect of Greek co-operation. | |
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14 |
A Question of Semantics |
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The irreconcilable problem—Kerr
formulates his plan—Russian intransigence—the Entente fully
committed—the King and Venizelos—a difference in emphasis—Streit
intervenes—Kerr is carried away—Venizelos’ reaction—the threat of
resignation—Kerr’s discouraging telegram—the prospect of Greek
participation founders—the threat from Bulgaria—the aftermath—Kerr’s
position—the difficulty of placing him—a fortuitous opportunity
arises—conclusion. | |
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PART III |
THE AFTERMATH | |
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15 |
‘Letting the Goeben Escape’ |
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The effect of
Goeben’s
presence—the options available to the Turks—the extent of Enver’s and
Souchon’s accountability—the search for a scapegoat—Churchill’s initial
responsibility—the cause of his enmity—a mitigating factor—Mallet’s
undiplomatic assertion—an alternative theory—Grey and the fate of
Constantinople—fear of Russian incursion into Persia—the march of
military operations—the Indian Expeditionary Force—the War Council
meets—action against Turkey—the Foreign Office exonerated. | |
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16 |
The Terrible ‘Ifs’ |
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Churchill’s invocation of a
higher authority—Churchill’s “if’s” considered—other “if’s” to be
considered—the battle cruiser concept—French inaction—the problem of
coal— Souchon and the Adriatic—Milne’s pre-conceptions—faulty staff
work—Churchill’s early moves—the board changes—Battenberg’s unfortunate
war—the Greek responsibility —the actions and omissions of Venizelos,
Constantine and Kerr—a chain of events—fate or the work of man? | |
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17 |
Court Martial |
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Milne’s recall—Troubridge and
Milne lay the groundwork for their defence—Milne’s frosty
reception—questions to answer—a friend at Court—official approbation—a
scapegoat is found—the awkward report of Captain Howard Kelly—a Court of
Inquiry —its finding—the charge as framed—pressure on the Prosecutor—the
Court Martial—the verdict—the Prosecutor’s personal opinion—Admiralty
reactions. | |
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18 |
Epitaph
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Admiral Hamilton’s unguarded
comment—what was discussed at the Admiralty?— Troubridge’s astounding
allegation—the mystery of Captain Vere—a possible answer— Troubridge’s
personality—a tenuous interpretation—who was to have the battle
cruisers? —Troubridge’s dubious recall—the convenient timing of an
important signal—the abandonment of Fawcet Wray—Mallet’s defence. | |
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19 |
The Last Sortie |
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The dire military position—Enver
is less assured—the Aegean Squadron—various contingencies—a moral
raising demonstration—should the British have known?—Admiral
Hayes-Sadler’s unfortunate decision—the separation of the British
forces—Rebeur-Paschwitz frames his orders—dubious intelligence—the raid
against Imbros on 20 January 1918—surprise is achieved—the damage
inflicted—the aerial attacks—the minefield— Rebeur-Paschwitz’s blunder—Breslau is lost—Goeben
marooned—further aerial attacks —a want of initiative—the efforts to
refloat the battle cruiser—Goeben
escapes again— aerial reconnaissance—the aftermath—Hayes-Sadler’s
contentious apologia—analysis of the aerial operations—another
reputation ruined—the end for Enver, Djemal and Talaat. | |
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APPENDICES
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i. |
The part played by the Opposition in the decision for war. | |
ii. |
Identity of alleged British collier from which
Goeben
coaled, Messina, 4-5 August. | |
iii. |
The Lost Day — Information received and processed in London on Sunday 9
August 1914. | |
iv. |
The Blücher
Mystery | |
v. |
Extracts from the Courts-Martial convened to investigate the sinkings of
Raglan
and M28. | |
vi. |
The reason for the absence of
Invincible
from the Mediterranean, 1914. | |
vii. |
Mediterranean War Orders. | |
viii. |
Pre-war Activities of British Naval Intelligence. | |
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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INDEX
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