British Policy in the Mediterranean,
1900-1914, the Commitment to France and
British Intervention in the War
xv + 611 pages
Full bibliography, notes and index
Card cover, 5¾" x 8¼"
ISBN 0 85958 690 1
Published 1999
THE MILLSTONE
British Naval Policy in the Mediterranean,
1900-1914, the Commitment to France and
British Intervention in the War
At half past two on the afternoon of Sunday,
2 August 1914, Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign
Secretary, informed the French Ambassador of
the decision just reached by the British
Cabinet — despite not yet being at war with
Germany, if, nevertheless, the German High
Seas Fleet ventured out from its base, the
British fleet ‘would intervene … in such a
way that from that moment Great Britain and
Germany would be in a state of war.’ What
led to the giving of this pledge? Was there
an obligation on Britain’s part, or merely a
commitment, moral or otherwise, to intervene
in certain circumstances? The Foreign
Secretary subsequently declared in his own
defence that the promise to the French ‘did
not pledge us to war.’ Grey was, however,
wrong — once the promise was made, British
entry into the war was certain. Despite
this, a group within the Cabinet spent the
afternoon of Sunday 2 August desperately
searching for an issue around which they
could group, and which would provide a more
convenient excuse for British entry into the
war than one based upon a moral commitment
to France; that excuse was to be Belgian
neutrality.
Two things virtually guaranteed British
entry in the war: the secret Anglo-French
military and naval talks, which commenced in
1906, and the naval position in the
Mediterranean. With Austria and Italy both
constructing dreadnoughts, and facing the
German naval challenge, British command of
the Mediterranean could no longer be
guaranteed. Similarly over-extended, the
French were unable to protect both their
Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines. From
strategic necessity came political
expediency. The Millstone will show:
That Grey was more aware of what was
settled by the secret military
conversations than he pretended to be.
That the situation created by the
German naval programme gave Britain no
option other than to evacuate the
Mediterranean.
That Anglo-French naval
co-ordination and strategic planning
remained chaotic.
That the Cabinet could not have
prevented Britain’s entry into the war;
all they could have done was to prevent
the formation of a coalition Government.
That the pledge to France and
consideration of British interests were
the sole determinants of Britain’s
entry.
That the German promise in August
1914 not to attack the French coast was
irrelevant.
That, far from informing the German
Government of the pledge given to Cambon
as he claimed, Grey was determined to
conceal this fact until Monday, 3
August.
That the issue of Belgian neutrality
was used in August 1914 to assuage
consciences and prevent the formation of
a coalition Government, but was not
crucial to the decision to intervene.
That the Continental policy,
committing British troops to fight in
Europe, was decided upon in August 1911
by a small inner circle of the Cabinet
who knew precisely what it would entail.
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