While
strength and preparedness were on Britain’s side, morality was not — at
least so far as the French were concerned. All the talk of ‘freedom of
action’ would soon be replaced by accusations as the French Ambassador, Paul
Cambon, was made aware that he could not automatically count on British support:
in the coming struggle his main weapon would be a humble piece of paper — the
November 1912 letter from Grey. But it was not the only
weapon in his armoury. On the afternoon of Friday 31 July, following the
inconclusive Cabinet meeting, Grey had had a ‘rather painful’ interview with
Cambon at which, in Asquith’s words, he ‘had of course to tell Cambon (for
we are under no obligation) that we could give no pledges, and that our action
must depend upon the course of events — including the Belgian question, and
the direction of public opinion here.’
Despite
this, the French Ambassador remained reasonably hopeful, and particularly so
when Grey told him that Lichnowsky had been informed that morning that ‘if the
conflict became general, Great Britain would not be able to remain neutral, and
especially that if France were involved Great Britain would be drawn in.’
Counting heavily on Grey’s eventual success in winning over his recalcitrant
colleagues, Cambon seemed to accept Grey’s statement that ‘before
considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situation to
develop.’ The Cabinet, Cambon informed Paris that evening, ‘could not commit
Parliament without consulting it beforehand’. Yet it was with a fait accompli that Grey would next go before the House. At this
stage, still counting on eventual British intervention, Cambon perhaps
recognized that a necessary prerequisite for the public conversion of the
waverers would be a flagrant violation of Belgian neutrality. This would provide
a greater impetus to public opinion than an argument based upon a moral
commitment to France. The Ambassador did, however, point out during his
interview with the Foreign Secretary that British intervention only
in the event of an actual German invasion of French territory would come too
late; he urged Grey to re-submit the matter to Cabinet ‘and to insist on
pledges being given to us without delay.’ Cambon turned on his heels, left the
Foreign Secretary’s room and immediately ran into Nicolson, who reassured him
that Grey would raise the issue at the Cabinet which was to be held the
following day, Saturday. The French Ambassador’s principal hope now rested
upon the German reply to the telegram sent from London that evening requesting
an ‘understanding to respect Belgian neutrality.’
In
addition to an anxious Ambassador, Grey also had to deal with his own permanent
staff. Crowe, in particular, emerged as the leading ‘hawk’, sending Grey
‘some simple thoughts which the grave situation has suggested to my mind.’
Crowe was deeply affected that Friday evening; one colleague recalled walking in
to his room to find that ‘the tears were glistening down the furrows of his
face, and all that he could say was “the poor French”.’
The ‘simple thoughts’ Crowe penned in his elegant script commenced with the
breathtaking statement that ‘The theory that England cannot engage in a big
war means her abdication as an independent State’, as if war were some test of
a nation’s manhood which had periodically to be undertaken.
The
argument that there is no written bond binding us to France is strictly correct
[Crowe continued]. There is no contractual obligation. But the Entente has been
made, strengthened, put to the test and celebrated in a manner justifying the
belief that a moral bond was being forged. The whole policy of the Entente can
have no meaning if it does not signify that in a just quarrel England would
stand by her friends. This honourable expectation has been raised. We cannot
repudiate it without exposing our good name to grave criticism.
Crowe
admitted that such arguments might result in Grey ‘getting angry but it may do
good.’
In fact, getting Grey annoyed in such a manner could well have proved
counter-productive.
In
Downing Street on Friday evening, still not reconciled to the loss of his
weekend away, Asquith ‘grappled’ with Lloyd George and the Directors of the
Bank of England, attempting to avert financial panic; they were subsequently
joined by Churchill and Grey. As the evening wore on members of the small group
drifted away, until, when only Asquith and two of his private secretaries
(Maurice Bonham Carter and Eric Drummond) remained, William Tyrrell arrived
‘with a long message from Berlin, to the effect that the German Emperor’s
efforts for peace had been suddenly arrested & frustrated by the Czar’s
decree for a complete Russian mobilisation.’ The quartet immediately drafted a
‘direct personal appeal from the King to the Czar’; Asquith then called a
taxi, and arrived at Buckingham Palace about 1.30 a.m. to haul the King out of
bed, for his approval. While one of his private secretaries was then dispatched
to the German Embassy to inform Lichnowsky of what had been done,
Asquith himself returned to Downing Street at 2 a.m. and ‘didn’t sleep
badly’.
The Prime Minister was not the only
senior figure conducting negotiations that night. The possibility that, rather
than condone a declaration of war, there might be numerous resignations from
Asquith’s cabinet brought the prospect of a coalition government that much
closer.
That this eventuality was being seriously considered was enough to alarm Asquith
and Grey. Churchill who, in view of his own parliamentary history, was not as
averse to a coalition as his colleagues, scurried to sound out his opponents.
‘Winston, I hear,’ Nicolson subsequently related, ‘in view of the
differences in the Cabinet, which might lead to a disruption was away for a time
in indirect negotiations with the leaders of the opposition for a coalition
cabinet.’
Churchill discussed the matter with F. E. Smith on the evening of Thursday 30
July and, the following night, Smith attempted to sound out Bonar Law, the
Conservative leader. Law, who was distinctly cool towards Churchill and
‘disliked indirect communications of this nature’, would give no more than a
general assurance that he would support the Government.
If George Lloyd had been aware of
this, the Conservative M.P. might have been spared a worrisome weekend.
Concerned at the turn of events, following an overheard remark of Asquith’s in
the House, Lloyd went to the French Embassy that Friday night and saw an
emotional Paul Cambon who allegedly told him:
‘I
have just been to see Sir Edward Grey and he says that under no conditions will
you fight.’ Cambon’s voice almost trembled as he went on to say: ‘That is
what he said. He seems to forget that it was on your advice and under your
guarantee that we moved all our ships to the south and our ammunition to Toulon.
Si vous restez inertes, nos côtes sont livrés aux Allemands.
While,
by itself, his argument regarding the naval aspect was spurious, Cambon then
made a far more serious accusation: that Grey had allegedly said his hands were
tied because the Conservatives would not support the Government. Lloyd’s
description of Cambon does not square with the image presented to Grey a few
hours earlier, when Cambon made his points with quiet insistence, safe in the
knowledge that Grey, at least, was whole-heartedly with him. Nevertheless,
despite the hour, Lloyd went to see General Sir Henry Wilson, no friend of the
Liberal administration, who apparently confirmed the charge.
Evidently, Wilson had been told something
of what had transpired that afternoon which he then took a malicious glee in
embellishing. ‘It’s all up,’ Lloyd informed Henry Wickham Steed soon
after. ‘The Government are going to “rat” … I have just left Sir Henry
Wilson … who has told me what the position is.’ When Wickham Steed, the
foreign editor of The Times, inquired
as to what the Opposition leaders were doing, Lloyd replied bitterly, ‘They
are going into the country to play lawn tennis … Balfour, Bonar Law, and the
whole lot of them. You forget that Monday is Bank Holiday!’
Wilson’s source must have come from within the Foreign Office, in which case
the prime suspect is Eyre Crowe, who had called on Wilson just before six
o’clock that afternoon with the news that the Russians had decided to proceed
to general mobilization. Crowe declared that he had just spent three-quarters of
an hour with Grey, ‘and he though the case was hopeless. Grey spoke of the
ruin of commerce etc.’ According to Wilson, despite ‘all Crowe’s arguments
[Grey] appeared determined to act the coward.’ Crowe, ‘in despair’, had
begged Wilson ‘to see Asquith of Grey, but of course they would not see me.’
As all this was happening the lamps
at the Foreign Office burned late in the short summer night. The morning of
Saturday, 1 August began early for Sir Arthur Nicolson. Just before midnight the
previous night he had been awakened at his house to receive an erroneous report
from the French Embassy that the French frontier had been violated.
Nicolson returned to his bed but summoned Henry Wilson at 7 a.m. on Saturday to
show him a dispatch ‘indicating that the Germans were about to assume the
offensive on both frontiers’; together, they went to see Grey, who was staying
at Haldane’s house in nearby Queen Anne’s Gate. The Foreign Secretary was
still asleep and Nicolson, loathe to wake him (for Grey had been dealing with
dispatches till 3.30 a.m.) returned to his own home in Cadogan Gardens for
breakfast before walking to the Foreign Office where the news was uniformly bad.
It could well have been that one of the last dispatches received by Grey before
retiring was the German reply to his query regarding Belgian neutrality. Jagow,
the German Foreign Minister, first refused to answer before consulting the
Emperor and the Chancellor and then intimated that no answer would be
forthcoming ‘as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war,
to have the undesirable effect of disclosing to a certain extent part of their
plan of campaign.’ According to Jagow, Belgium ‘had already committed
certain acts which he could qualify as hostile.’ When pressed to provide
details, the most warlike act which the Foreign Minister could adduce was the
embargo placed by the Belgian Government on a consignment of grain bound for
Germany.
Once Grey arose he had to face in the full light of day the realization that,
confronted with Russian mobilization, nothing now would restrain Germany.
The
hours between waking and the commencement of yet another Cabinet, scheduled for
11 a.m., must have been the most oppressive the Foreign Secretary had yet
experienced since the start of the crisis. Although all his instincts should
have told him that the latest news represented the parting of the ways, Grey
decided upon a last, bizarre attempt to buy time.
Together with Haldane, Grey arranged to see Asquith half an hour before the
Cabinet. Then, just as the Cabinet
was about to convene, Grey sent William Tyrrell personally to see the German
Ambassador to inform him that Grey hoped ‘as the result of a Cabinet meeting
now in session, to be able to give [him] this afternoon some facts which may
prove useful for the avoidance of the great catastrophe.’ Judging by the hints
dropped by Tyrrell (who may have exceeded his remit), Lichnowsky guessed that
what Grey was intending to propose was a formula based upon the supposition that
‘in case we did not attack France, England would remain neutral and would
guarantee France’s neutrality.’
Lichnowsky’s surmise rested upon a misunderstanding.
Having
been disturbed at seven o’clock that morning, Henry Wilson returned to his
house in Draycott Place for breakfast. With understandable annoyance Wilson had
already complained that no meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence had been
called and that ‘no military opinion had been asked for by this Cabinet.’
His own response was to continue his campaign to force the Opposition to exert
pressure upon the Government; in case this should fail, he also advised Panouse,
the French Military Attaché, to suggest to Cambon that if Grey continued to
refuse to intervene, Cambon should at once ‘break off relations and go to
Paris.’ There was one other item of practical concern to the General. Some
units of the Army were then undergoing training ‘a long way from their
mobilization centres’. As a result of this dispersion, mobilization, when it
came, would be delayed for three days. Asquith had been approached on Friday on
the subject, when he refused to halt the training, although he did announce his
intention of putting the matter before Saturday’s Cabinet.
The
Cabinet met on the morning of Saturday 1 August from 11 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. and it
was ‘no exaggeration’ recorded Asquith, ‘to say that Winston occupied at
least half of the time.’ The First Lord was ‘very bellicose & demanding
immediate mobilisation’ which the Cabinet refused – for the moment – to
sanction. Indeed, no sooner had the session commenced when Grey took the
unprecedented step of leaving the Cabinet room to telephone Lichnowsky with the
proposal hinted at by Tyrrell: would the German Government assure that, if
France remained neutral in a Russo-German conflict, Germany would not attack the
French? On his own responsibility Lichnowsky gave the assurance sought which, he
informed Berlin, Grey was to use ‘at today’s Cabinet session.’
A few minutes after Grey returned to rejoin his colleagues Asquith wrote to the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff informing him that training was not
to be suspended and to put on record the fact that Britain had never promised to
send an expeditionary force to France.
Thus, in the space of a few minutes discussion, the Cabinet had refused to
sanction naval mobilization; refused to sanction the dispatch of the
Expeditionary Force; and had apparently acquiesced in Grey’s approach to the
German Ambassador.
But
did Grey actually make use of Lichnowsky’s assurance? Or, in the intervening
period, while the fate of the B.E.F. was being debated, did Grey see a new line
of attack open to him: one provided by the inept German reply received that
morning regarding the observance of Belgian neutrality?
(Given the importance with which English neutrality was suddenly viewed in
Berlin, it seems astonishing that Jagow should have chosen to reveal German
intentions in such an open manner.) There is no doubt that Jagow’s reply was
discussed by the Cabinet. Did Grey lead the discussion around to consideration
of what must have appeared to be the imminent violation of Belgian neutrality,
or did he bide his time, waiting for one of his colleagues to raise the point?
In any event, the dealings that morning with Lichnowsky were based upon a
misapprehension. When Tyrrell approached Lichnowsky on Saturday the Ambassador
had inquired as to the nature of the proposal Grey planned to submit that
afternoon. Tyrrell replied to Lichnowsky’s question with one of his own:
‘whether Germany, if France did
not attack her, would also remain neutral’. Lichnowsky took this ‘to mean
that Germany should in that case not attack France’. However, Tyrrell had
actually meant ‘that Germany should in that event remain quite neutral.’
It has been suggested that the overture to Lichnowsky came solely at the behest
of Tyrrell himself; Tyrrell had, for some time, been anxious to promote a better
Anglo-German understanding, and distrusted Russia. If so, this is further
evidence of the rift which had developed amongst Grey’s advisers. When news of
the Cabinet’s latest position reached the Foreign Office staff, the response
was immediate. Nicolson had already had to be talked out of resigning the
previous night by Crowe who, according to his own account, ‘personally
prevented five more resignations from going through’ that Saturday. ‘Feeling
in the office’, Crowe declared, was ‘such that practically everyone wants to
resign rather than serve a Government of dishonourable cowards.
Notwithstanding
his faintheartedness that morning, Grey declared (and, given his personal
responsibility in the matter, he had but little option) ‘that if an out &
out & uncompromising policy of non-intervention at all costs is adopted, he
will go.’ Despite making this
stand, Grey’s refusal to countenance non-intervention was not, as was made
apparent by the question put to Lichnowsky, the same thing as holding out the
hope of immediate participation. The majority of the Cabinet clearly remained
opposed to British entry. Lloyd George was still apparently ‘all for peace’
as were Morley, Simon, Burns, Harcourt, and other less important members of the
Cabinet, collectively referred to by Asquith as the ‘Beagles’.
The Cabinet, Asquith conceded, had come ‘every now & again, near to the
parting of the ways’. Asquith believed that, if it came to war, there would be
‘some split in the Cabinet’ and
that, if Grey went, he would join him and ‘the whole thing would break up’.
This ever-present threat to the Radical wing was balanced by the decisions not
to send the Expeditionary Force or mobilize the Fleet, which represented a
resounding victory for the non-interventionist group in the Cabinet. This should
have provided an ideal opportunity for Lloyd George to stake his claim as
undisputed leader of the Radical wing. His position within the party had
diminished that summer following a poorly received Budget,
and yet, when the opportunity now presented itself to take advantage of the
looming split the Chancellor, ‘sensible & statesmanlike’, was ‘for
keeping the position still open.’
The explanation for this was that the Chancellor’s professed opinion
effectively disguised his private view. It is difficult not to believe that,
following his study of military strategy since 1911, Lloyd George did not
appreciate that the German reply that morning meant only one thing: that a
violation of Belgian neutrality was imminent.
Despite
Churchill’s near monopoly of the discussion that day, he was not in a position
to advance a compromise position; instead, with Lloyd George apparently
unwilling, this fell to Herbert Samuel, whose rôle in the events of this and
the following day has recently been re-evaluated.
Samuel wrote to his wife that evening to inform her that ‘We may be brought in
under certain eventualities’ and to claim credit for a ‘suggestion of mine
[which] was adopted by the Cabinet [and] which may a good deal affect the issue.
I am less hopeful than yesterday of our being able to keep out. The Cabinet is
solid as yet, but the testing time may come tomorrow.’
Much, Samuel concluded, depended on ‘Germany’s attitude to the neutrality of
Belgium.’ Hazlehurst has speculated that Samuel’s ‘suggestion’ was not
to send the Expeditionary Force;
however, in all likelihood, this decision had already been taken before the
Cabinet met. In view of Samuel’s concluding remark, and the fact that he had
been to the Foreign Office that morning to read the latest dispatches, including
Jagow’s response to Grey’s query, it is much more probable that Samuel
advocated that the Cabinet should wait until a clear breach of Belgian
neutrality by Germany effectively relieved them of having to make the decision
to intervene. Such a flagrant violation of the 1839 Treaty would assuage the
consciences of most of the anti-war group, could be used subsequently to justify
their actions, and would explain Asquith’s comment that ‘The main
controversy pivots upon Belgium & its neutrality.’
Grey,
who was later described as ‘intensely anti-German’ by Simon, had been put
under increasing pressure to moderate his stance. Indeed, so much pressure was
applied that Grey reluctantly agreed ‘not to insist on supporting France’ if
Germany respected Belgian neutrality.
Unquestionably, Grey must have known that such an event was unlikely; however, it
did represent a climbdown, no matter how tenuous, from his previous position.
There was, however, one tangible outcome of the meeting: either on his own
account, or possibly by using Samuel as a proxy, Grey was authorized to approach
Lichnowsky to state that, if Germany violated Belgium’s neutrality, ‘it
would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.’
Grey’s desire to support the French at all costs, and Churchill’s eagerness
to get to work with his fleet, were insufficient to carry the day; there was
nothing to do but wait upon events. Although the Cabinet parted ‘in a fairly
amicable mood’ the decision to intervene was now more finely balanced than
ever.
Tyrrell was dispatched once more to see Lichnowsky on an errand which would
compound the ‘misunderstanding’ that had already arisen. Grey, Tyrrell
announced, wanted to see the Ambassador at half past three that afternoon to
make ‘proposals for England’s neutrality, even in the event of [Germany]
being at war with France as well as with Russia.’
Sir
Edward saw Lichnowsky as arranged to read the following statement, ‘which was
unanimously drawn up by the Cabinet’, and to clear up the misunderstanding
which had apparently arisen:
The
reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is
matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect
feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive
reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to
relive anxiety and tension here, while on the other hand, if there were a
violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other
respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this
country.
Though
couched diplomatically, the message could not have been more clear. Lichnowsky
inquired, if Belgian neutrality were respected, could Grey give a ‘definite
declaration’ of British neutrality; Sir Edward could not. Should Germany
‘violate Belgian neutrality in a war with France,’ Grey replied, ‘a
reversal of public feeling would take place that would make
it difficult for the Government here to adopt an attitude of friendly neutrality.’
The Foreign Secretary wondered whether Germany and France might not ‘remain
facing each other under arms, without
attacking each other, in the event of a Russian war.’ Lichnowsky subsequently related that, in
answer to his question as to whether Grey ‘could undertake any guarantee for
the behaviour of the French in such a contingency, [Grey] could give me no
satisfactory answer.’ The German Ambassador realized that Grey was himself
‘convinced of the impossibility of keeping two fully equipped armies facing
each other inactive for months at a time.’ Lichnowsky further realized that
that ‘a positive proposal on the part of England is on the whole not in
prospect’. When Lichnowsky’s cable reached Berlin at two minutes past ten
o’clock that evening it was soon to be annotated with the Kaiser’s lively,
if infamous, marginalia: Grey was a ‘false rascal’ spouting ‘drivel’,
‘humbug’ and ‘rot’; he was ‘crazy or an idiot’. Nevertheless,
Wilhelm’s parting comment did come closer to the truth: ‘My impression is
that Mr Grey is a false dog who is afraid of his own meanness and false policy,
but who will not come out into the open against us, preferring to let himself be
forced by us to do it.’
Grey then saw Cambon again after the
interview with Lichnowsky to inform him that, in the event of a localized
Russo-German conflict, Germany had agreed not to attack France if she remained
neutral. If France, Grey added, ‘could not take advantage of this position, it
was because she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties, and of
which we did not know the terms. This did not mean that under no circumstances
would we assist France, but it did mean that France must take her own decision
at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we were not now in a
position to promise.’ The Ambassador, with justifiable truculence, replied
that he ‘could not and would not’ transmit such a message. Cambon thereupon
suggested that he should inform his Government that the Cabinet had not yet
taken any decision, at which Grey responded ‘that we had come to a decision:
that we could not propose to Parliament at this moment to send an expeditionary
military force to the Continent. Such a step has always been regarded here as
very dangerous and doubtful. It was one that we could not propose, and
Parliament would not authorize unless our interests and obligations were deeply
and desperately involved.’ Cambon, caught genuinely unaware by Grey’s
statement, replied that the northern French coasts were undefended and a
tempting target for the German fleet, which might attack them any day.
Although it would provide him with the argument he needed to convert the
waverers, in the presence of the French Ambassador Grey was not to be moved by
mention of this threat. If he perhaps thought the threat to be exaggerated,
Cambon most certainly did not. The Ambassador telegraphed a warning to Paris
that evening recommending that Grey’s intention (to wait until Sunday or
Monday before proposing to his colleagues that any attempt by the German fleet
to enter the Channel or attack French coasts should be resisted) must be kept
secret. If they ‘were to leak out and come to the notice of Germany,’ Cambon
asserted, ‘the imperial fleet would hasten into the Channel.’
Despite
the account given to George Lloyd on Friday evening, Cambon had undoubtedly
believed that British participation alongside France was assured in the event of
a German attack. Grey’s statement to him on Saturday afternoon provided a
severe jolt to this expectation. The British Foreign Secretary was playing his
cards close to his chest; not even Cambon was to be admitted to Grey’s thought
processes that afternoon. The French Ambassador, while recognizing that ‘Some
ministers, but not all, had been influenced by weighty representations from
important men in the City in favour of British neutrality’, had yet counted on
the support of ‘three or four ministers’ being decisive.
Cambon’s ‘three ministers’ were presumably Asquith, Grey, Churchill, but
who was the fourth? It could have been Haldane, Crewe or McKenna; or did Cambon
see through Lloyd George’s public stance? What Cambon might not have
anticipated was that the tail might wag the dog; that, as France and Germany
also mobilized, Britain was standing idly by, paralysed by the refusal of the
Cabinet to appreciate the situation and by Grey’s inability to convert the
waverers. Cambon had no option but to resume the offensive with Grey: ‘After
all that has passed between our two countries’, he exclaimed,
after
the withdrawal of our forces ten kilometres within our frontier so that German
patrols can actually move on our soil without hindrance, so anxious are we to
avoid any appearance of provocation; after the agreement between your naval
authorities and ours by which all our naval strength has been concentrated in
the Mediterranean so as to release your Fleet for concentration in the North
Sea, with the result that if the German Fleet now sweep down the Channel and
destroys Calais, Boulogne and Cherbourg, we can offer no resistance, you tell me
that your Government cannot decide upon intervention? How am I to send such a
message? It would fill France with rage and indignation. My people would say you
have betrayed us. It is not possible. I cannot send such a message. It is true
that agreements between your military and naval authorities and ours have not
been ratified by our Governments, but you are under a moral obligation not to
leave us unprotected.
Grey
would do no more than hold out the hope that a German attack upon the French
coast or the violation of Belgian neutrality ‘might alter public feeling
here’ and he promised that he would ‘ask the Cabinet to consider the point
about the French coasts.’
This was not enough for Cambon who,
‘white and speechless’, staggered into Nicolson’s room muttering, ‘Ils
vont nous lâcher, ils vont nous lâcher.’ After being seated by the
Permanent Under-Secretary, Nicolson went to see Grey, whom he found ‘pacing
his room, biting at his lower lip.’
When informed of the Cabinet decision, Nicolson similarly was left to exclaim,
‘But that is impossible, you have over and over again promised M Cambon that
if Germany was the aggressor you would stand by France.’ Grey replied, ‘Yes,
but he has nothing in writing!’
When Nicolson returned to his own room, Cambon had recovered his composure and
suggested that the time had come to produce ‘mon petit papier’ — the 1912 letter. As Nicolson subsequently
informed Hardinge: ‘On Saturday Cambon pointed out that at the request some
time ago of our Admiralty the French had sent all their fleet to the
Mediterranean on the understanding that we would protect their northern and
western coasts. This was a happy inspiration on the part of Cambon and to this
appeal there could be but one answer…’ Only one answer there may have been,
but it had nothing to do with the 1912 letter which specifically denied the
pledge Cambon was now attempting to redeem.
Nicolson
urged the French Ambassador not to send an official Note and, instead, an hour
later wrote himself to Grey that ‘M Cambon pointed out to me this afternoon
that it was at our request that France had moved her fleets to the
Mediterranean, on the understanding that we undertook the protection of her
Northern and Western coasts. As I understand you told him that you would submit
to the Cabinet the question of a possible German naval attack on French Northern
and Western Ports it would be well to remind the Cabinet of the above fact.’
To this Grey minuted that he had spoken to Asquith and attached ‘great
importance’ to the point being settled the next day, Sunday 2 August.
It had been a trying afternoon for Nicolson who had also had to deal with a
second distraught Ambassador, Tewfik Pasha.
At
noon on Saturday the final instalment was about to be paid on the dreadnought Sultan
Osman and the Turks proposed to hoist the National flag that afternoon. At
2.30 p.m. word came through confirming that the money had, indeed, been
deposited; there was now no time for the British to lose. One of the Armstrong
directors went aboard the ship, located the Turkish overseer, Captain Raouf, and
invited him to the director’s private residence. ‘It was considered a wiser,
as well as more graceful act, to make this communication in private rather than
on board ship’, recorded the Admiralty representative, Captain Power. Raouf
Bey was informed of the Admiralty’s decision and ‘took the matter in the way
we hoped’, reported Power, ‘though evidently he was deeply moved, and he at
once telephoned the Turkish Ambassador in London.’
Following the telephone call from Raouf, Tewfik Pasha went immediately to the
Foreign Office where Nicolson informed the Ambassador that,
in
view of the serious situation abroad it was not possible to allow a battleship
to leave these waters and pass into the hands of a foreign buyer. Of course had
she been here on a visit it would have been different, but it was considered
that in the present tension it was not right to hand over to the buyer a newly
built battleship. The Admiralty had, I believed, taken possession temporarily of
her — as it would have been discourteous to have taken any steps once the
Turkish flag had been hoisted and a Turkish crew placed on board.
The
Ambassador, according to Nicolson, ‘seemed puzzled — and said 3 million
pounds had been paid for the ship. I told him he would not lose the money. He
asked for how long the ship would be detained. I told him we were before the
unknown & it was impossible to say.’
Churchill’s
action was to be used by Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister for War, in
Constantinople that night to force his reluctant colleagues into accepting the
calamitous alliance with Germany. At the Grand Vizier’s villa the inner circle
of the Turkish ruling body spent the evening debating the draft of the proposed
Turco-German treaty. Opinion, as it had been in London, was divided. The liberal
Minister of Finance, Djavid Pasha, was particularly indignant, arguing that the
expectation of a German victory was a fatal mistake which would cause the
disappearance of Turkey from the map if they lost. With the others remaining
quiet, it was left to Enver to seize the initiative. Dismissing Djavid’s
argument, Enver announced provocatively, if prematurely, ‘There is nothing
that we can do, the matter is now settled and the Grand Vizier has already
signed the agreement.’
In fact the treaty was not signed until 4 o’clock on the afternoon of Sunday 2
August.
To put the seal on any further discussion Enver followed up this dramatic early
morning announcement by reading out a telegram just received from Tewfik Pasha
in London which contained the stunning news that the two Turkish dreadnoughts
had been embargoed by the British.
Djemal’s reaction was typical of those in the room: ‘Never, never shall I
forget my mental anguish when I heard this frightful news.’
Although
there is little Churchill could have done other than to embargo the ships, the
result was the adherence to German of a new ally at a critical moment. There was
one other important implication: Goeben,
which might otherwise have been recalled to Northern waters, was ordered to
remain in the Mediterranean. The German Ambassador to the Porte, Baron von
Wangenheim, cabled his Foreign Office on Saturday that if Goeben could be spared she could, by reinforcing the Turkish fleet,
hold off the Russians. This would have the effect both of assuring the cable
connection with Roumania and preventing a Russian landing on the Bulgarian coast
— and, Wangenheim need hardly have added, would have done no harm to the
alliance negotiations. The Ambassador was to be disappointed, however: on the
evening of Sunday 2 August, and as yet unaware that the Turco-German treaty of
alliance had already been signed that afternoon, the Kaiser replied through his
aide-de-camp that Goeben could not be
dispensed with at the present time. Admiral von Pohl, the Chief of the German
Admiralty Staff, not only agreed but maintained that Goeben could provide the greatest service in the Atlantic or North
Sea and had no business in Turkish waters.
The news Admiral Wilhelm Souchon,
the commander of the Mittelmeerdivision,
received from Berlin on the 2nd was not good: hostilities had commenced against
Russia, war with France was certain and would probably begin on the 3rd, Great
Britain would ‘very probably’ be hostile and Italy neutral.
No mention was made of the attitude of Austria-Hungary and no specific orders
were given to Souchon; he therefore took matters into his own hands and drew up
a plan to bombard the ports of Philippeville and Bona on the Algerian coast in
an attempt to disrupt the passage of the French XIXth Army Corps. Having become
aware, late on the morning of Monday 3rd, of the signing of the alliance in
Constantinople Admiral von Pohl in Berlin began to relent in his earlier
opposition to Goeben going east, his
reluctance finally being overcome by the enthusiasm of Tirpitz.
Within hours – and upon their own authority – Pohl and Tirpitz issued orders
for Goeben and Breslau to proceed to Constantinople. Wilhelm, having subsequently
been informed, agreed and the Foreign Office duly sent a cable to Ambassador
Wangenheim at 7.30 that evening to notify him of the change in plans and suggest
that Souchon should be placed at the disposal of the Turks to command their
fleet. Souchon received the
unexpected message some two hours before his ships were due to open fire on the
French North African ports. ‘To turn round immediately,’ he later wrote,
‘on the verge of the eagerly anticipated action, was more than I could bring
myself to do.’
On
the surface, Grey had suffered a serious setback in the Cabinet on Saturday, 1
August; he was, in all probability, not aided by Churchill’s ‘bellicose’
performance. How hard did Grey try to push his colleagues in the direction of
intervention? In the absence of any minutes or Asquith’s customary letter to
the King, it is almost impossible to say. Did Grey hold back from the final
commitment and allow his pacifist colleagues to dominate? There is no doubt
that, by this stage, Grey accepted that war, and with it British intervention,
was inevitable. Was he reacting out of perversity, against the relentless advice
of his own permanent officials? Did he realize that, with half Europe mobilizing
as they debated, the Cabinet would finally be overtaken by the march of events?
Grey must have been acutely aware of Cambon’s prediction that, by waiting
until French territory had been invaded, British intervention ‘then would be
too late’. While the less committed members of the non-interventionist group
looked for a means (in their case, the possible violation of Belgian neutrality)
to justify a decision for war, Grey needed an excuse which could be used
forthwith to force a decision from the reluctant Cabinet. He would use the
threat which already existed to the northern coasts of France. After an
exhausting day the Foreign Secretary then went off to dine at Brooks’s and
play billiards with his parliamentary private secretary, in whom he confided
‘that he would have his “tussle” with the Cabinet tomorrow.’
Churchill
dined alone at the Admiralty on Saturday night devouring, in addition to his
meal, for his appetite was whetted by the prospect of war, the foreign telegrams
as they came in. Just before ten o’clock he was joined by F. E. Smith and Max
Aitken, and they began a hand of bridge. Before they could pick up their cards,
another dispatch box arrived. The lamps were still not completely extinguished,
but flickered dimly; peace hung by a thread until Churchill read the latest
news, which was to send a gust down Whitehall: Germany had declared war on
Russia. Churchill walked across Horse Guards and entered 10, Downing Street by
the garden gate, going up to the drawing room where a knot of ministers —
Asquith, Haldane, Crewe and Grey (who had finished his game of billiards) —
was gathered.
Churchill declared that, notwithstanding the Cabinet’s existing injunction
that morning, he wished to proceed to full naval mobilization and justify his
action to the rump of the Cabinet the following morning. After discussing the
latest news, Churchill and Grey left together when, according to Churchill, Grey
said: ‘You should know I have just done a very important thing. I have told
Cambon that we shall not allow the German fleet to come into the Channel.’
Upon hearing this, Churchill ‘went back to the Admiralty and gave forthwith
the order to mobilize.’
If Churchill’s recollection was accurate, Grey’s action would have
pre-empted the Cabinet discussion the following day; however, the Foreign
Secretary’s account of the conversation differs crucially from the First
Lord’s. According to Grey, he told Churchill that:
The
French might be sure that the German fleet would not pass through the Channel,
for fear that we should take the opportunity of intervening, when the German
fleet would be at our mercy.
I promised however to see if we could give any assurance that, in such
circumstances, we would intervene.
This
was a different thing altogether.
This exchange does highlight one of
the Foreign Secretary’s two ‘cardinal points’, as identified by Churchill:
his fixation with the English Channel.
Whatever
happened [Churchill recorded], if war came, we could not allow the German Fleet
to come down the Channel to attack the French ports. Such a situation would be
unsupportable for Great Britain. Everyone
who counted was agreed on that from a very early stage in our discussions.
But in addition we were, in a sense, morally committed to France to that extent.
No bargain had been entered into. All arrangements that had been concerted were
… specifically preluded with a declaration that neither party was committed to
anything further than consultation together if danger threatened. But still the
fact remained that the whole French Fleet was in the Mediterranean. Only a few
cruisers and flotillas remained to guard the Northern and Atlantic Coasts of
France; and simultaneously with that redisposition of forces, though not
contingent upon it or dependent upon it, we had concentrated all our battleships
at home, and only cruisers and battle-cruisers maintained British interest in
the Mediterranean. The French had taken their decision on their own
responsibility without prompting from us, and we had profited by their action to
strengthen our margin in the Line of Battle at home. Whatever disclaimers we had
made about not being committed, could we, when it came to the point, honourably
stand by and see the naked French coasts ravaged and bombarded by German
Dreadnoughts under the eyes and within gunshot of our Main Fleet?
Grey’s ‘fixation’ was to
provide him with the argument he needed to guarantee British intervention. It
was an argument Churchill professed to see through: would the Germans, Churchill
asserted, really have been so stupid as to provoke British intervention by such
a move? ‘It seemed to me, however, very early in the discussion’, Churchill
later recorded, ‘that the Germans would concede this point to keep us out of
the war, at any rate till the first battles on land had been fought without us;
and sure enough they did.’
This judgment would appear to be severely tempered with hindsight. If, as indeed
they eventually did,
the Germans pledged not to threaten the northern coasts of France in an attempt
to guarantee British neutrality would they have been believed? It has become
axiomatic in the accounts of the weekend’s debate that the concern over the
‘defenceless’ northern coasts of France was largely irrelevant due to the
apparent German willingness to provide a pledge to refrain from offensive naval
action.
However, in view of the ambivalent German response to Grey’s entreaty on
Friday; in view of the German declaration of war against Russia on Saturday
evening; in view of the German invasion of Luxembourg on Sunday morning; and in
view of the knowledge that the German Mittelmeerdivision
had left the Adriatic steaming westwards on their mission to interfere with the
French troop transportation,
had not the Germans completely exhausted their remaining reserve of goodwill?
Already, British ships had been detained in Hamburg while the Germans laid mines
in the mouth of the Elbe.
It had been known since the morning of 28 July that units of the German Fleet
which had been in Norwegian waters had taken in ‘considerable quantities of
coal’ and departed hurriedly.
A further intelligence report, received on the afternoon of 2 August, noted that
the second and third battle squadrons of the German Fleet had passed through the
Kiel Canal the previous night from the Baltic to the Elbe.
Although these moves could have been portrayed as defensive, by this time
Germany was only at war with Russia. By 3 August it was reported that the entire
German High Sea Fleet had ‘passed through the Kiel Canal steaming
westwards’. What was the rationale
behind this move? Is it not possible that it was interpreted in London as
presaging offensive operations, either against Britain or the coasts of France?
No matter how much evidence is adduced to prove that the German Government would
not have made such a move, the point
of contention is whether the members of the British Cabinet believed that they
were capable of such an action. And clearly, after what had occurred within the
previous twenty-four hours, eighteen of the nineteen members of the Cabinet
thought Germany capable of uttering a false promise. Cambon certainly believed
that, if Berlin suspected for a moment that London was hesitating before
deciding to guarantee the defence of the French coasts, the High Seas Fleet
‘would hasten into the Channel.’ Rather than the British debate regarding
the French coasts being irrelevant, it was in fact the German pledge, which came
too late in any event, which was the irrelevancy.
German naval operational plans
dating from November 1912 were based upon ‘offensive mine warfare against the
enemy coasts’, coupled with the use of U-boats to attack British transports
and ‘contaminat[e] the lines of approach to the embarkation and disembarkation
harbours’ of the B.E.F. These offensive operations, to be of any use, were to
be undertaken immediately upon the outbreak of war, which, in the case of
France, was Monday 3 August. The mining operation had but one purpose: so to
weaken the Grand Fleet that a major battle could be envisaged in circumstances
not unfavourable to the High Seas Fleet. The principle war task of the German
C-in-C ‘should be to damage the blockading forces of the enemy as far as
possible through numerous and repeated attacks day and night, and under
favourable circumstances to give battle with all the forces at your disposal’.
Before the time limit to the British ultimatum to Germany on Tuesday 4 August
expired the converted German minelayer Königin
Luise had already sailed from Borkum on her mission to mine the approaches
to the Thames. Although sunk in the process, she claimed a victim — the
British light cruiser Amphion — on
the first full day of the war.
Churchill’s comment contains
another important clue, foreshadowing the decision which would be reached at
Sunday’s Cabinet. Churchill referred to ‘Everyone who counted’. Despite
the ‘victory’ for the non-interventionists on Saturday, it would become
clear on Sunday that a section of the Cabinet no longer counted. On Saturday
Asquith remained preoccupied with Cabinet unity: ‘we may have to contemplate
with such equanimity as we can command’, he noted, ‘the loss of Morley, and
possibly (tho’ I don’t think it) of the Impeccable [Simon].’ If Asquith
could limit the resignations which might follow as a result of British
intervention he might then be able to forestall the demand for a coalition. His
own view of the prospect was succinctly stated: ‘It will be a shocking thing
if at such a moment we break up — with no one to take our place.’
The question remained, what number of resignations could be accepted? Burns and
Morley, who both looked certain to depart, could be accommodated. If Simon,
Harcourt and Beauchamp joined them, over a quarter of the Cabinet would
disappear, and with them, the possible future of the Liberal Party. If, however,
Simon could be persuaded to remain, as Asquith evidently thought was possible on
Saturday afternoon, he might bring other waverers on board. Two battles would be
fought on Sunday, 2 August. The first, on the decision to intervene, would be
the easier. Churchill was correct: in the face of ‘everyone who counted’ the
Cabinet small-fry could not hope to hold out. The second battle concerned the
future of the Liberal Party. In this fight, Asquith was undeniably to be aided
by the powerful instincts of his colleagues’ political self-preservation which
would eventually triumph over such a trifling matter as conscience.
As
the Cabinet struggled with the rapidly deteriorating situation on Saturday and
Henry Wilson remained in London exerting what influence he could, George Lloyd
was dispatched to Wargrave Manor to fetch Bonar Law back to London.
Late that night the ‘conspirators’ (Lansdowne, Balfour, George Lloyd, Henry
Wilson, the Duke of Devonshire and Lord Edmund Talbot) gathered at Lansdowne
House and decided that Asquith must be fronted; however, a telephone call early
Sunday morning to Downing Street was not put through to Asquith, who was asleep
and not to be disturbed. In the meantime Lloyd, who believed that Bonar Law did
not understand the ‘gravity of the situation’, had gone to meet Austen
Chamberlain at Charing Cross to convince him that definite action was required.
Chamberlain arrived at Lansdowne House first thing Sunday morning, only hours
after the meeting had broken up, and, while Lansdowne finished his breakfast,
urged that an immediate statement of Conservative policy should be made to
Asquith. Convinced at last, Bonar
Law penned the following:
Lord
Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as
in that of all our colleagues with whom we have been able to consult, it would
be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in
supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our
unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider
necessary for that object.
As
Grey pointed out,
there was no mention of Belgium; the letter was dispatched to Downing Street.
Asquith’s
own Sunday morning routine was interrupted, not by the Opposition, but by the
German Ambassador, who called, ‘very émotionné’,
while the Prime Minister was breakfasting and implored him ‘not to side with
France.’ Lichnowsky, agitated, weeping and quite heartbroken, claimed that,
‘with her army cut in two between France & Russia’, Germany was ‘far
more likely to be “crushed” than France.’ Asquith replied that there was
no desire for British intervention, but that it rested ‘largely with Germany
to make intervention impossible, if she would (1) not invade Belgium, and (2)
not send her fleet into the Channel to attack the unprotected North Coast of
France.’
Asquith must have suspected, if he did not already know, that the first
condition was incapable of being fulfilled. At three o’clock the previous
afternoon, a cable had been received in the Foreign Office from Berlin: the
Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Alick Russell, was ‘confident [that] in
event of war Germany will pass part of her forces through Belgium.’
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