Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher

…I don’t like the Mediterranean! However, there’s no mistake about it that the Mediterranean is the tip-top appointment of the Service, and, of course, if there’s war, there’s a peerage or Westminster Abbey. But it’s pretty sure to be Westminster Abbey.
Admiral Sir John Fisher  
23 March 1899

The Mediterranean is of necessity the vital point of a naval war, and you can no more change this than you can change the position of Mount Vesuvius, because geographical conditions, Sebastopol and Toulon, and the Eastern question, will compel the Battle of Armageddon to be fought in the Mediterranean.
Admiral Sir John Fisher
1 December 1900

As to the policy of reducing the Mediterranean Fleet, the matter is most simple. The margin of power in the North Sea is irreducible and requires this addition of the Mediterranean battleships … We cannot have everything or be strong everywhere. It is futile to be strong in the subsidiary theatre of war and not overwhelmingly supreme in the decisive theatre. The moral effect of an omnipresent fleet is very great, but it cannot be weighed – at least in the Cabinets of the Powers – against a main fleet known to be ready to strike and able to strike hard.
Admiral Sir John Fisher
24 June 1912

THE MILLSTONE

British Naval Policy in the Mediterranean, 1900-1914, the Commitment to France and British Intervention in the War

SYNOPSIS

At half past two on the afternoon of Sunday, 2 August 1914, Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, informed the French Ambassador of the decision just reached by the British Cabinet — despite not yet being at war with Germany, if, nevertheless, the German High Seas Fleet ventured out from its base, the British fleet ‘would intervene … in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war.’ What led to the giving of this pledge? Was there an obligation on Britain’s part, or merely a commitment, moral or otherwise, to intervene in certain circumstances? The Foreign Secretary subsequently declared in his own defence that the promise to the French ‘did not pledge us to war.’ Grey was, however, wrong — once the promise was made, British entry into the war was certain. Despite this, a group within the Cabinet spent the afternoon of Sunday 2 August desperately searching for an issue around which they could group, and which would provide a more convenient excuse for British entry into the war than one based upon a moral commitment to France; that excuse was to be Belgian neutrality.
Two things virtually guaranteed British entry in the war: the secret Anglo-French military and naval talks, which commenced in 1906, and the naval position in the Mediterranean. With Austria and Italy both constructing dreadnoughts, and facing the German naval challenge, British command of the Mediterranean could no longer be guaranteed. Similarly over-extended, the French were unable to protect both their Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines. From strategic necessity came political expediency. The Millstone will show:

• That Grey was more aware of what was settled by the secret military conversations than he pretended to be.
• That the situation created by the German naval programme gave Britain no option other than to evacuate the Mediterranean.
• That Anglo-French naval co-ordination and strategic planning remained chaotic.
• That the Cabinet could not have prevented Britain’s entry into the war; all they could have done was to prevent the formation of a coalition Government.
• That the pledge to France and consideration of British interests were the sole determinants of Britain’s entry.
• That the German promise in August 1914 not to attack the French coast was irrelevant.
• That, far from informing the German Government of the pledge given to Cambon as he claimed, Grey was determined to conceal this fact until Monday, 3 August.
• That the issue of Belgian neutrality was used in August 1914 to assuage consciences and prevent the formation of a coalition Government, but was not crucial to the decision to intervene.
• That the Continental policy, committing British troops to fight in Europe, was decided upon in August 1911 by a small inner circle of the Cabinet who knew precisely what it would entail.  

 Chapter

Table of Contents

1

Changing fortunes

Britain’s strategical interest in the Mediterranean following the opening of the Suez Canal — the French threat — the propagation of naval scares — naval expenditure is increased — the Naval Defence Act of 1889 — the Mediterranean debates of the 1890s — the dissipation of the French threat — Fisher as C-in-C, Mediterranean — the necessity for economy — Fisher is appointed First Sea Lord.

2

The Fisher Factor

The perils of taking Fisher at face value — his inconsistency — Fisher’s remit — the elimination of the French and Russian threats — French policy in Morocco — Fisher’s preference for Alexandria — the constant redistribution of the British Fleet — the Anglo-French Entente — the first Moroccan crisis — Russia’s defeat — the naval centre of gravity moves north — the inception of the battle cruiser — new methods of fire control.

3

Bigger Guns and Greater Speed

The example of the Russo-Japanese War — the importance of long-range gunnery — the threat posed by the torpedo — real or imagined? — the tactical advantage of speed — finding a suitable rôle for the battle cruiser — the German response to the new class — renewed calls for economy — the Mediterranean fleet is halved.

4

Foreign Entanglements

The threat from Germany — the Committee of Imperial Defence — its objects — Admiralty hegemony — the formulation of War Plans to assist the French — the Navy’s plan is found wanting — a change of Government — an innocent discussion group — a fortuitous meeting while riding — the military correspondent of The Times — the Army view prevails — an interview with the French Ambassador — the ‘great question’ — Sir Edward Grey authorizes Anglo-French Staff Talks — Cabinet debate is denied — who knew what and when? — the influence of the Under-Secretary — a sanguine appraisal — Fisher rejects the military strategy — the moral force created by the Entente —a bribe for Germany? — the heckling of the French Senator — the awkward question.

5

Plans of War

Fisher attempts to quell his critics — the subsequent naval War Plans — Beresford finds fault — the War Plans controversy continues — the clamour for a Naval War Staff — the threat of war in 1908 — the Invasion Sub-Committee — Fisher’s unexpected reaction — the Tweedmouth letter — the international situation — Anglo-French naval talks — the “three conventions” — the French reaction — the entrenchment of the Continental Strategy — the great naval scare of 1909 and its aftermath.

6

A New Enemy

The Mediterranean naval race and its implications — French reactions — the great Fisher-Beresford feud — an Asquithian compromise — agitation for a Naval War Staff increases — Fisher’s tenure ends — Admiral Wilson is appointed First Sea Lord — his faults — the Anglo-Russian entente — Empire or encirclement? — the Straits question — a difficult year in the life of the Liberal Government — the resumption of Anglo-German naval conversations.

7

Agadir

The origins of the crisis — the British position in the Mediterranean — Churchill enters the debate — Admiral Wilson is unconcerned — the conciliatory approach of Grey — the subsequent flare-up — Lloyd George speaks his mind — were British interests affected? — the German Ambassador’s fury — tension eases — the Continental commitment outlined — Haldane’s secret initiative — the C. I. D. pronounces on strategy — Admiral Wilson’s lamentable performance — the inept naval alternative.

8

The Right of Free Choice

Asquith determines on changes at the Admiralty — Haldane’s longing for the position — a second suitor — the ramifications of Admiral Wilson’s performance — Anglo-French naval talks are re-activated — increasing French confidence — the French centre of gravity moves south — the mania for secrecy — Asquith’s concern— the militarization of the “Terrible Twins” — policy is dictated by considerations of strategy — fear of French military weakness and the position of Belgium — Churchill stakes his claim for the Admiralty — the influence of Henry Wilson — the Radicals fight back — all change at the Admiralty — a confrontation in the Cabinet.

9

Churchill Arrives

The revivification of Fisher — the formation of a Naval War Staff — its defects — Churchill determines on a new First Sea Lord — the Turco-Italian War — Fisher and Alexandria once more — Churchill’s renewed interest in the Mediterranean naval situation — a French rebuff — Battenberg’s unease — the finalization of the Naval War Staff — the German novelle — Churchill’s attempt to bypass the Committee of Imperial Defence — the plan to withdraw the Mediterranean battleships.

10

“We cannot have everything or be strong everywhere”

The Haldane mission — proposals and counter-proposals — Churchill’s unhelpful intervention — the Anglo-German talks fail — French suspicion — the Mediterranean to be evacuated — the Naval Holiday — the proposed recasting of the fleet — the Foreign Office becomes involved — Sir Arthur Nicolson is let in on a secret — an alliance with France? — the War Office reaction.

11

The Malta Compromise

A small victory for the Cabinet — the summer cruise of Asquith and Churchill — Admiral Beatty’s idea — the Malta meetings — Churchill overcomes Kitchener — Kitchener enlists Grey’s help — Churchill tries to overcome the Cabinet — a job for the battle cruisers — McKenna fights back — the question of figures — who was right? — Churchill marshals his support — Sir Arthur Nicolson’s cold feet.

12

The Numbers Game

The C.I.D. sits in judgment — a loose compromise — Esher is elated, Churchill deflated — a trap for the Canadians — the Canadians escape — the dispositions for the Mediterranean are set — the pliable Admiralty — the Franco-Russian Naval Convention — Churchill’s new initiative — the private and public stances of the Admiralty — formal Anglo-French conversations.

13

The Obligation

The Austrian enigma — Poincaré spins a web — Churchill holds out for freedom of action — the problem of finding a successor to Admiral Troubridge — the French move their battleships from Brest — the relentless French pressure — Italian machinations — complications in the Mediterranean — the Grey-Cambon letters — the question of command — naval reaction to the First Balkan War — Bridgeman is outmanoeuvred — Battenberg fulfils an ambition.

14

The Polarization of the Mediterranean

A lack of resources — the Algerian Corps in French plans — the first British battle cruiser arrives — the completion of the technical Anglo-French arrangement — Battenberg’s cloak and dagger — Mediterranean War Orders — Admiral Milne’s friendly advice — Churchill’s Mediterranean diversions — the Adriatic position — the renewal of the Triple Alliance Naval Convention — the questionable naval co-operation of Italy and Austria-Hungary — a British naval demonstration is required — Beatty wants his ships back — Churchill’s estrangement from the C.I.D. — flaws in the Naval War Staff — Italian duplicity — Grey does not rise to the bait — San Giuliano cries “wolf”.

15

Naval Estimates and the Question of Substitution

Churchill and the policy of Dreadnought substitution — the storm over the 1914-15 Estimates — Lloyd George speaks his mind again — his estrangement from Churchill — the Canadian dreadnoughts fail to make up the shortfall — Churchill’s flexible Mediterranean policy — Asquith intervenes — Lloyd George compromises — the submarine question — the future for Dreadnoughts.

16

The Limitations of Foreign Policy

Faulty intelligence — Churchill redeems his pledge — the question of substitution once more — a source on ready-made Dreadnoughts — the evolution of tactics — French strength — the French attempt to cement the bond — an initial lack of co-operation — Milne to be responsible for Goeben — Sazonov renews his approach — Britain’s hand is forced — preliminary Anglo-Russian talks are instigated — a diplomatic leak — Grey is discomfited — German knowledge of the talks.

17

“Before the unknown”

The British pledge to France and its implications — the onset of the crisis — Ulster dominates — the growing awareness — Grey’s proposal for a Conference — localizing the conflict — the question of Belgian neutrality — the Cabinet hedges its bets — the Continent mobilizes — a shameless German proposal — the naval situation — Churchill pre-empts the Cabinet — the embargo of the Turkish Dreadnoughts.

18

“Mon petit papier”

Grey’s ‘painful’ interview with the French Ambassador — the position of the permanent officials at the Foreign Office — Churchill’s intrigue — Cambon’s allegation — Saturday’s Cabinet and Grey’s unusual initiative — a misunderstanding — Grey’s threat to go — Lloyd George refuses to take the Radical whip — the issue of Belgian neutrality becomes paramount — Cambon goes on the attack — the outcome of the embargo — Grey’s ‘fixation’ with the English Channel — German naval operational plans — the future of the Liberal Party.

19

The Decision for War

The unprecedented Sunday Cabinet — Grey argues for a pledge to France — the Cabinet is split — the conversion of the middle section— Asquith’s reasoning — Grey controls the agenda — Italian neutrality and the Mediterranean position — Grey’s pledge to Cambon — the problem of Goeben and Breslau and the French troop transportation — the ‘excuse’ of Belgium— Samuel’s exaggerated rôle — the cynical policy of Lloyd George.

20

“A terrible business”

Cabinet resignations — the army is neglected — an emotional scene in the Cabinet — Grey prepares for his speech — the atmosphere in the House — Grey rises to speak — his lengthy defence of his policy — Grey carries the House — loud and prolonged cheers — Churchill’s immediate reaction — the question of Cabinet unity — Goeben and Breslau are sighted — Churchill is restrained — the moral force of the Grey-Cambon letters — Grey’s responsibility.

21

Summary and conclusions

Bibliography

Index

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The Conspiracy Behind the Escape of Goeben and Breslau

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British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign

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British Policy in the Mediterranean, 1900-1914, the Commitment to France

and British Intervention in the War

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