On
5 April 1902 Arthur Balfour wrote (or rather dictated, as he detested the
physical act of writing) a letter to Selborne, the First Lord, in which he
admitted finding ‘it extremely difficult to believe that we have, as you seem
to suppose, much to fear from Germany — in the immediate future at all events.
It seems to me so clear that, broadly speaking, her interests and ours are
identical. But I have sorrowfully to admit that the world, unfortunately, is not
always governed by enlightened self-interest.’
If any differences existed, they were apparently confined to the Colonial arena:
the nature of the German grievance had been spelled out to Balfour a few years
earlier when the Kaiser complained to Sir Frank Lascelles, the British
Ambassador, that he ‘had spared no efforts to bring about such an
understanding, but what was the result? The demands of Germany were in no way
exorbitant. She was only picking up the bits which England had left, and in
spite of the friendly assurances he had received, the demands of Germany were
met by His [sic] Majesty’s
Government either by a curt refusal or by an absolute want of consideration for
the interests of Germany.’
Balfour, who fancied himself a keen amateur strategist, and who stressed that
the Empire was ‘pre-eminently a great Naval, Indian and Colonial Power’,
had become increasingly disenchanted with the Defence Committee of the Cabinet
while concomitantly recognizing the need for the reform of the services in
general and, following its lamentable performance in the Boer War, the Army in
particular.
The War Office at the time was effectively discredited, while the Navy basked in
public esteem; when, therefore, Balfour became Prime Minister on 12 July 1902 he
was susceptible to pressure from the Admiralty for a new body to be formed to
oversee imperial defence.
Hugh Arnold-Foster, the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty and its
Commons’ spokesman, had raised the issue on 20 June; then, in October, he
presented Selborne with a memorandum advocating the formation of a new co-ordinating
body which, inter alia, would inquire
‘on what grounds the excess of expenditure upon the Land Forces is justified
in a purely Maritime Empire’.
Both Selborne (in concert with Fisher) and the Secretary of State for War,
William St John Brodrick, had schemes afoot for reform. Brodrick, already unsure
of Balfour’s wholehearted support, was further discomfited when Arnold-Foster
called into question the share of the defence budget received by the army at a
time when it was persuasively being argued that the defence of Britain and her
Empire depended upon naval supremacy above all else; the army should be
subsidiary to this overriding requirement. Fisher, for example, would later
never tire of using what he referred to as Sir Edward Grey’s “splendid”
words: ‘The British Army is a projectile to be fired by the Navy’.
Both Selborne and Brodrick, desiring the issues to be aired in a wider forum,
co-authored a memorandum addressed to Balfour on The
Improvement of the Intellectual Equipment of the Services and hinted at the
possibility of a joint ministerial resignation if action were not taken. In the
face of this threat the customarily languid Balfour took the necessary steps and
reorganized the moribund Defence Committee of the Cabinet into the Committee of
Imperial Defence (C.I.D.). The first secretary of the new organization would be
Sir George Clarke who duly recorded the objects for which the Committee was
established:
A.
To ensure full discussion of all matters directly or indirectly affecting
Imperial Defence and falling within the purview of more than one Department of
State. B. To ensure that questions
affecting more than one Department are brought to the notice of all other
Departments concerned. C. To bring
about a settlement of questions in dispute between two Departments of State.
D. To bring the Naval and Military experts into direct touch with
Ministers, who can therefore question them freely and fully, thus avoiding the
misunderstandings which may arise from Minutes and Memoranda…
As
with so many fine initial intentions, Clarke’s were more often breached than
observed.
The Board of Admiralty, led at the time by a strong First Lord, supported
by Balfour, and with cogent arguments and a clear view of their imperial
responsibilities, dominated the new Committee. The military on the other hand
became increasingly involved in internecine disputes regarding the practical
extent of the withdrawal or reduction of various world-wide garrisons while at
the same time remaining, in principle at least, opposed to those very same
reductions. The C.I.D.:
became
a battlefield on which the political chief of the War Office strove to fend off
his military advisers. Meanwhile, the Admiralty overruled everybody, imposing
their view with the full support of the Prime Minister, and frequently of an
exasperated Secretary of State for War. And so there grew up during 1903, and
extended throughout 1904 and 1905, a consistent pattern of decisions on matters
of imperial and home defence that, without exception, favoured the Admiralty
case. Admiralty policy was in no way questioned.
By the summer of 1905 the Russian fleet had been removed from the
Admiralty’s calculations at a time when the first Moroccan crisis presaged the
realignment of naval and military forces to meet the growing German threat. In
order to counter the threat, some degree of naval and military co-ordination was
required — a point forcefully argued by Captain Charles Ottley, the Director
of Naval Intelligence, in July.
Fisher, determined to entrench the Admiralty in its premier position within the
C.I.D., acted on Ottley’s suggestion that a permanent sub-committee of the
C.I.D. be formed ‘to Consider and Elaborate Schemes of Joint Naval and
Military Expeditions’.
The defeat of Russia by Japan had also allowed the possibility of a
reduction in the army’s commitment to India, in view of the diminution of the
Russian threat, which would therefore free troops for operations nearer home.
Fisher’s proposed joint operations would be designed in part to make sure the
troops were kept fully occupied and ‘out of mischief’.
What emerged was a scheme by which, following a German land attack against
France, Britain, holding command of the sea, would attempt to create a diversion
with a threatened invasion of Schleswig-Holstein. Fisher, himself not a
strategist, was influenced by Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, C-in-C Channel, who he
incorrectly identified as one. Wilson argued that a blockade of Germany would
serve little purpose and could result in the humiliation of Britain as its ally,
France, was overrun. If Germany’s neighbours, particularly Holland and
Denmark, remained neutral Wilson believed the course that seemed ‘most worthy
of consideration would be an attempt to capture the Works at the mouths of the
Elbe and Weser by a combined military and naval expedition.’
Building on this, Fisher’s paper for Balfour (probably written by Ottley
himself) took the argument one step further and suggested that the very fact
alone of the embarkation of British troops ‘would compel Germany to place
troops all along her coasts, and thus perhaps appreciably reduce the strength of
her army on the French frontier.’
The new sub-committee was inaugurated at the 76th meeting of the C.I.D.
on 20 July 1905 and its brief was outlined at the following meeting;
shortly thereafter the summer holidays intervened. Balfour’s precarious
political position (he was to fall in December), the supposed ambivalence of the
Liberals to the C.I.D., and the opposition of the General Staff together ensured
that the sub-committee never sat.
As a precaution, however, the army did carry out an investigation of the
Admiralty’s scheme: a report was compiled by Captain Adrian Grant-Duff on
“British Military Action in the Case of War With Germany”. Late in August
the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Ballard, was contacted by
Colonel Callwell, of the Director of Military Operations department, regarding
the feasibility of the Schleswig-Holstein landings. Callwell sent Ballard a copy
of Grant-Duff’s paper then, as he himself was going on leave, Callwell
delegated the problem to his subordinate, Major J. D. Fasson, with the hopeful
but incorrect admonition that the Baltic Coast scheme would ‘probably be the
first thing considered by the Sub Comte of the C.I.D. when the holidays are
over.’ Fasson duly prepared two pages of objections to the scheme, referring
to them as ‘a few rough notes on Fisher’s invasion of Germany!’ and passed
these to Grant-Duff, who was now detailed to deal with Ballard. Grant-Duff was
equally dismissive of the Navy’s plans in an internal memorandum but was
somewhat more evasive when fending off Ballard on 7 September.
In a typical example of War Office methods, Ballard, by now impatient for a
direct response, wrote to Grant-Duff two days later only to learn that, now,
Grant-Duff had also gone on leave. If nothing else, the flow of correspondence
raised the ancillary question as to how far these exchanges between relatively
junior officers might commit the General Staff. This point was not lost on
William Robertson, the Assistant Director of Military Operations, who, upon
learning of the correspondence, decreed late in September that future exchanges
should be sanctioned by the General Staff.
A final appraisal was eventually completed by 3 October at which time Callwell,
who had now returned from his leave, was able to inform Ballard of the Army’s
view as to the impracticality of the scheme.
Callwell instead advanced the War Office’s counter-proposal for aiding
the French by direct military commitment. ‘An efficient army of 120,000
British troops’, Callwell argued, ‘might just have the effect of preventing
any important German successes on the Franco-German frontier, and of leading up
to the situation that Germany crushed at sea, also felt herself impotent on
land. That would almost certainly bring about a speedy, and from the British and
French points of view satisfactory, peace.’
This proposal had originated in July when Balfour, at the behest of Clarke, the
secretary of the C.I.D., requested a paper from the War Office on the subject of
a German outflanking move through Belgium and possible British support for the
Belgians. The War Office replied on 29 September that, based on data supplied by
the Admiralty, it would take twenty-three days to mobilize and ship two Army
Corps to Belgium.
Throughout this period, Fisher’s attitude had been tempered by his belief that
war was almost inevitable as a result of the Moroccan crisis and it was this
belief which had influenced his demand for the sub-committee in the first place.
It is also possible that, during the crisis, Fisher lacked the restraining hand
of the First Lord, Cawdor, who had been dogged by ill-health during his short
tenure of office (March – December 1905) leaving Fisher at the helm during the
fraught summer months. With the French acceptance of the demand for a conference
(to be convened at Algeciras) to consider the Moroccan question the threat of
war seemed to have receded; however, by this time, the steps had already been
taken to set up the sub-committee.
A born centralizer, Fisher now faced the alarming prospect either of
having to share power or, worse, look on helplessly as the proposed
sub-committee transmogrified into an embryonic joint General Staff with an
executive rather than advisory authority. To this was added the not unincidental
consideration that he perhaps believed his Baltic scheme, for which no detailed
plans existed, would not stand close examination. Arnold-Foster’s opinion, in
particular, was scathing: ‘The idea…’, he admitted to his diary, ‘that
we could land on the German coast is really so ridiculous.’
Nevertheless, having now been apprised of the Army’s scheme, Fisher attempted
to ensure the continuance of the Admiralty hegemony at the C.I.D. On 10 October
he wrote to Jack Sandars, Balfour’s political private secretary, that
under
no circumstances was it contemplated that Great Britain could or would undertake
single-handed a great military continental war, and that every project for
offensive hostilities was to be subsidiary to the action of the Fleet, such as
the occupation of isolated colonial possessions of the enemy, or the assistance
of an ally by threatening descent on the hostile coast, or otherwise effecting a
diversion on her behalf.
Balfour, who certainly entertained reservations with regard to Fisher’s
strategy, had other things on his mind. It would be neither the first, nor the
last, time that domestic political considerations would impinge upon the
question of naval and military policy. And, as John Gooch has noted, the timing
of this particular crisis (in the interval between the resignation of Balfour
and before the general election), ‘offered a unique opportunity to permanent
officials of the War Office and Cabinet to influence the course of strategic
policy without regard to the wishes of the government of the day.’
The Prime Minister’s grasp on power was slipping, his party hopelessly
divided. By the end of October Balfour was still hoping that, in a general
election, the Liberals would be denied an overall majority; by November this
possibility had all but disappeared and he had decided to resign. Only the fear
that the C.I.D. – in effect his creation and which was still required to
complete the revision of British strategy – might be allowed to wither by the
Liberals kept Balfour clinging to office in the last forlorn months of 1905.
That, and the fact that he believed the Liberal party might not be able to form
a united Cabinet due to differences on general policy between some of its
leading members. In the event, this assumption was to prove a complete
miscalculation.
Although eminently foreseeable, Balfour’s resignation, on 4 December 1905,
threw Sir George Clarke into something of a panic. As the Liberals, under Sir
Henry Campbell-Bannerman, began to form a new administration (in which the
important post of Foreign Secretary would be occupied by Sir Edward Grey)
the secretary of the C.I.D., feeling ‘derelict’ without Balfour and
conscious that the political situation in Britain might lend itself to a
pre-emptive German strike before the Algeciras conference convened, decided to
investigate the preparedness of the services to come to the aid of the French.
At the first of the meetings so convoked Clarke was joined by a powerful
camarilla comprising: the shadowy Reginald Baliol Brett, Viscount Esher, (a
close friend of the King who flitted ubiquitously in high circles, always
shunning responsibility, until he was unceremoniously dumped after Edward’s
death); Ottley, representing the navy; and General Sir John French (the
Commander at Aldershot) representing the army. Clarke’s anxieties were
heightened by the realization that the navy possessed no detailed plans. His
apprehension was made clear to Esher on 15 December:
Ottley
tells me that the Admiralty studies go no further than the mobilization of the
reserve fleet, and bringing up the Atlantic fleet in certain circumstances. The
Naval C’s in C have their war orders, which tell them what ships will go to
them. Arrangements are made for mobilizing signal stations along the coast. This
is practically all that has been done and it is not nearly enough. The system
under which the supreme direction passes wholly to Wilson, who has not only to
fight, but to make all arrangements for protecting commerce if necessary, is I
hold quite unsound…
Clarke
also expressed his view that the Admiralty’s need for a General Staff was as
great as that of the War Office.
The first meeting of the
extramural group on 19 December concluded that direct aid to France as a result
of the violation of Belgian neutrality would be both unpopular with public
opinion and unlikely ‘to confer any real advantage upon our allies’.
Other options included a landing at Antwerp to assist the Belgians and the
seizing of a part of the German mainland for subsequent combined operations.
French and Ottley were directed to investigate these options, including the
‘continuous ferrying of a force of 120,000 men to French ports’. Fisher (by
now convinced there would be no war) had lost interest and Clarke’s discussion
with him in mid-January 1906 was to prove ‘very unsatisfactory’. At least
Fisher was aware of these “informal” meetings; remarkably, the Army General
Staff were not, though it did not take long for word to leak out.
The Director of Military Operations, Major-General Grierson, had become
aware of French fears of an attack by Germany at this time when he chanced to
meet (or so he claimed) Major Victor Jacques Marie Huguet, the French Military
Attaché in London, while riding in Hyde Park.
In response to the Attaché’s anxiety Grierson indiscreetly informed Huguet,
in a calculated leak, of the British position and of his own personal belief
that a small British force could be landed at Calais to ‘unite with the French
forces, of whom it would, for example, form the left wing.’
Grierson, who had surprisingly been excluded from Clarke’s ‘innocent
discussion group’ (or perhaps not so surprisingly, as he considered that the
Admiralty plan was ridiculous), fortuitously learned what was going on and
approached the military correspondent of The
Times, Colonel a’Court-Repington – who was known as a confidant of Esher
– with an unusual request. At Grierson’s behest, Repington duly wrote to
Esher that a ‘flustered dignitary’ at the War Office had learned of the
informal meetings and had roundly denounced them.
Repington, virulently anti-German, had also written an article which appeared in
the Times on 27 December and which naturally caught Huguet’s
attention. The following day the French Military Attaché, not wishing to miss
such a conspicuous opportunity, met Repington for dinner, after which they
engaged in a wide-ranging five hour discussion. Despite his locquaciousness,
Huguet’s major concern was to ascertain the extent of probable British
assistance in a Franco-German war.
Repington promptly sent Sir Edward Grey, then holidaying in Fallodon, a report
of the confidential talk he had had, in which Huguet ‘confessed that his
Embassy felt anxious upon the question of the attitude of the new Government in
England…It was not a question of sympathies, but rather of acts, and of what
the British Government were prepared to do in a situation which presented
dangerous aspects.’
In other words, would the incoming Liberal administration not only honour
Lansdowne’s 1904 agreement, which was the formal basis for the Entente, but
also confirm Lansdowne’s alleged assurances of British support, which the
French had chosen to misinterpret? When Repington hinted to Huguet that he would
let Grey know ‘the general purport of this part of the conversation’ the
Frenchman raised no objection.
Indeed, Huguet would later maintain that, as he believed Grierson’s initial
meeting was not a chance occurrence, the subsequent talks carried the
government’s imprimatur.
Coincidentally, on the same day that Repington was busy with this
correspondence, Clarke suggested to Esher that, as the attitude of the French
would have some bearing on the findings of the C.I.D. conferences, the British
Military Attaché in Paris, if absolutely trustworthy, could sound out the
French General Staff to clarify some points ‘and thus expedite the settlement
of British policy in this crisis.’
In a crucial change to this plan the services of the Military Attaché were
dispensed with and Repington, despite being deemed ‘a somewhat irregular
channel’, was designated to act as intermediary as he had become so much
involved.
The catalyst for the change of plan was a letter Repington himself had forwarded
to Clarke. As Clarke admitted to Esher on New Year’s Day, 1906, ‘As he [Repington]
is in contact with the Fr. Mily. Attaché, I have asked if he would sound him on
some points as to which we want information. This will be much safer than using
our Mily. Attaché in Paris. It is very necessary to do nothing that would alarm
the Govt. and besides the W.[ar] O.[ffice] would balk. The tragic facts of the
situation are that: 1. If the Germans proceeded to unprovoked aggression, the
feeling in this country would demand our cooperation. 2. If the Germans violate
Belgium we come in automatically. I am not sure that the French Govt. realizes
either of these propositions.’
On the day before the next scheduled meeting of Clarke’s group on 6
January 1906 Repington was given a list of eleven questions which had been
drafted by Clarke to deliver to Huguet and, through the Attaché, to the French
General Staff. As Williamson has noted: ‘In a very real sense the staff talks
had begun.’
The replies would not arrive till the 11th and, when they did, were entirely
predictable in advocating the support of British troops to assist the French
Army as quickly as possible after the outbreak of war while additionally
deprecating any combined landings on the German coast. The problem of purely
naval strategy could be left to the Admiralty. Meanwhile the second meeting of
Clarke’s group had taken place, at which Clarke and Ottley continued to favour
a combined scheme but still lacked detailed plans; even so, the German coast
scheme was deemed ‘impractical’.
Due to the need for swift action if a crisis suddenly developed, and because of
the ‘comparative ease with which the Straits of Dover could be guarded by the
Navy’, attention was focused on the best and most immediate method to support
the French — by landing troops in ‘the Northern French ports.’
When the third of these informal meetings was held on the afternoon of 12
January Grierson, anxious that the General Staff view should prevail, presented
himself, with the result that the policy of direct military intervention became
entrenched. This was made clear when Ottley reported to Fisher that ‘It was
settled between the Military Officers
that, in the event of our being forced into war (by a German violation of
Belgian neutrality or otherwise) — our proper course would be to land our
Military forces at the nearest French ports…About 100,000 British troops and
42,000 horses would be available for such a purpose within 14 days of the
outbreak of war…The process of transporting the troops would be in the nature
of a Ferry…’
To make sure that Fisher was fully aware of the unilateral decision which had
been reached, Clarke himself saw the First Sea Lord to apprise him of the
outcome of the third meeting. Realizing at last the extent to which the meetings
had been hijacked by the military faction, Fisher had had enough. Clarke
promptly supplied Esher with a record of the conversation, which began with the
First Sea Lord declaring:
that
he wants our Navy to do everything, that we have ample force, that the French
would be in the way and so on. I said that it would be absolutely necessary to
consider French susceptibilities, which he seems to ignore. Then he said he
wished the French torpedo craft and submarines to be concentrated near the
Straits of Dover, as apparently they will be. He was averse to having a secret
code of signals ready to give to the French, although he seemed to realize that
the danger of mistakes is very great…Fisher then said that he would never be a
party to military co-operation with the French on French territory; but I
pointed out that, in this case also, we must be guided by French wishes to some
extent…Of course the French G[eneral] S[taff] are thinking of the moral effect
upon their own troops of which they are better judges than we are. Then F[isher]
said it would be a nuisance to the navy to have to guard the “Ferry”, that
the navy wanted to “get away to sea”, etc…His mind was still running on
the Schleswig-Holstein plan; but I said that, after examining the charts, that
coast appeared peculiarly unfavourable to a landing and more conveniently
situated for the German forces than the Baltic. I said I understood that the
Admiralty thought it inadvisable to send a fleet with transports into the Baltic
at the outset of war. He denied this and did not seem to think the difficulty
too great; but I could see that he had never studied the question at all. In any
case, clearly to carry some 75 transports through either the Sound or the Belts
would be a vastly more difficult and absorbing business for our Navy than to
safeguard the ‘Ferry’. Finally I gathered that the idea of selecting a cache
for our battlefleet where torpedo boats and submarines would not find it, was
occupying F’s mind. This seemed inconsistent with much that he had said and
left me marvelling. He may have intended to mystify me, though I do not think
so. My strong impression remains that nothing has been thought out and that so far as preparedness, other than the mere
mobilization of ships is concerned, the Admiralty is not at all in advance of
the W.O.
Following
the discussion with Clarke, Fisher saw the writing on the wall and forbade
Ottley to attend thereafter.
The next meeting, sans Ottley, considered the replies of the French General Staff and
reached the conclusion ‘that in the event of the British force being employed
on the French frontier its status would be that of an independent body under the
general control of the French C.-in-C.’
With a policy now firmly in place, and Ottley no longer allowed to attend, the
conferences had outlived their usefulness.
In
the meantime, following Balfour’s resignation, Campbell-Bannerman wasted no
time in calling a general election both to capitalize on the unpopularity of the
Conservatives and to seek a solid mandate;
polling in the election began on 13 January 1906. ‘For years’,
Campbell-Bannerman taunted his Conservative opponents, ‘they’ve lived on
tactics, and now they’ve died of tactics!’
Prior to this, although most candidates had been fully engaged in their
constituency campaigns, Sir Edward Grey, the new Foreign Secretary, perforce had
to interrupt his canvassing in Northumberland to return to the Foreign Office
where, on 10 January, the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, put ‘the great
question’ to him by inquiring whether Britain would underpin her diplomatic
support of France by force if necessary. Perhaps expecting such an approach,
Grey had been briefed by Clarke the previous day on the current state of defence
preparedness; Clarke took the opportunity to mention his contact with Huguet.
This was the first occasion on which a member of the government was made aware
of the unofficial conversations. Grey agreed with Clarke that it was
‘impossible to approach the French through official channels to ascertain what
their views on co-operation are, as this would give the idea of an offensive and
defensive alliance which does not exist.’ How much this was genuinely Grey’s
own view, and how much he was being led by Clarke, is open to question. What is
clear is that, from Grey’s purely personal point of view, it was a singularly
inappropriate time for the matter to have arisen. Grey authorized the
continuation of the unofficial talks, and, at Clarke’s prompting,
both men agreed that it would be best, at this preliminary stage, not to inform
Campbell-Bannerman.
In the circumstances, with the election in the offing, at his first official
meeting with the French Ambassador Grey could do no more for Cambon than to
pledge a benevolent neutrality, ‘if such a thing existed’. He did venture,
however, as a consolation of dubious value, that a German descent upon France
would strongly move public opinion in Britain. This would not suffice for so
muscular an Ambassador as Cambon. ‘M. Cambon’, according to Grey, ‘said
that a promise of neutrality did not of course satisfy him, and repeated that he
would bring the question to me again at the conclusion of the Elections.’
As this was Grey’s first meeting as Foreign Secretary with the French
Ambassador, and as Grey was able to read French but was not confident enough to
converse in the language, he requested that his Permanent Under-Secretary, Lord
Sanderson, should also be present at the interview.
Grey and Sanderson, the former subsequently related in his memoirs,
sat
side by side on the leather sofa in the room of the Secretary of State: Cambon
in an arm-chair opposite to us. The recollection of the whole scene is vivid to
me. Cambon proceeded to develop the views of his Government and to put the
question asking for a promise of armed help in the event of German aggression.
Sanderson felt all the awkwardness of the situation; he knew the unsettling
consequences of not answering the question favourably; he knew that it was
impossible for me to answer it; one hand was resting on his knee, and, as Cambon
pressed the French view, the hand kept uneasily and restlessly beating up and
down upon the knee, a movement of which Sanderson no doubt was quite
unconscious, but which was eloquent of the entanglement of the moment.
Although,
generally, the interview went well, there was one jarring moment for Sanderson:
this occurred not when Cambon referred
to ‘unofficial communications’ that had already passed between the Admiralty
and the French Naval Attaché – which was deemed acceptable – but when
mention was made of similar communications that had taken place ‘between the
Military Authorities and the French Military Attaché, not
directly but by intermediaries.’ To Sanderson, this ‘looked very much as
if the conversations which we know that Col. a’Court-Repington has had with
the French Military Attaché had been taken by the latter and by the Embassy as
being authorized by our General Staff.’ On the following day, after Grey had
returned north, Sanderson asked Grierson ‘whether he had made any inquiries of
the kind directly or indirectly.’
Grierson replied that he had not done so, but urged that ‘informal
communication should be opened between the General staffs on both sides,’ to
which he added that he saw ‘no difficulty in such communication being made on
the express understanding that it commits the Government to nothing.’
When this was brought to Grey’s attention, he declared that he had no
reason to disapprove of the communications, provided that they were continued in
the ‘proper manner’, that is, ‘with the cognizance of the official heads
of the Admiralty and War Office’ and on the understanding that they should be
‘solely provisional and non-committal.’
Without, apparently, making any firm inquiries Grey was convinced that this was
indeed already the case with the Admiralty;
however, with regard to the War Office, he decided to see Haldane, the new
Secretary of State for War, to seek his approval for talks to commence between
Grierson and Huguet. Grey agreed to meet Haldane, a firm supporter of the C.I.D.,
at Berwick on the 12th where Haldane was due to address Grey’s constituents.
After the rally Grey took Haldane on a long carriage drive during which Grey
enlightened Haldane of the French concerns and quizzed him on the British state
of preparedness. Grey was content that all naval preparations were safe in the
hands of Fisher; however, he remained distinctly uneasy that communications
between the War Office and Huguet had been undertaken by Repington on an
unofficial basis.
Writing some years after the event, Haldane, who was apparently unaware of
Clarke’s surreptitious activity,
maintained that he mentioned that ‘general conversations’ had occurred
before his time at the War Office but that ‘the one thing needful, the
interchange of scientific General Staff ideas, had not taken place to anything
like the extent which modern standards of preparedness required.’
Haldane further asserted that, on the eve of the poll (which began on 14 January
and lasted a fortnight), he had returned to London to apprise the Prime Minister
of the situation. Campbell-Bannerman, Haldane alleged, then sanctioned, with
some reluctance, the authorization of talks ‘on the express understanding that
it should be stated in writing that the conversations were not to go beyond the
limits of purely General Staff work and in no way committed the Government to
action.’
In fact, as Grey himself acknowledged on 15 January, Campbell-Bannerman would
not return to London (from Scotland) before 25 January at the earliest.
Having placed the talks on an official basis, Grey and Haldane now kept the
Prime Minister in the dark till late January, though it must be added that, at
least in so far as Grey was concerned, he expected that a full Cabinet debate
would follow.
Before this, with the election in progress, Cabinet debate of Grey’s
authorization was impossible: ‘all my colleagues’, Grey had declared on 15
January, ‘are fighting their own or other election contests and I am alone in
London and cannot consult them or get them together.’
Four days’ later, Grey sought an interview with Campbell-Bannerman in London,
but the Prime Minister showed no inclination to return. Grey admitted, however,
that he had now informed Asquith (then the Chancellor) of all that had passed.
On the 22nd, Grey also mentioned the fact of the conversations to Lord Ripon,
the leader in the Lords, although it appears that the discussion with Ripon was
not particularly wide-ranging.
When the Cabinet reconvened at the end of the month Campbell-Bannerman, now
himself admitted to the secret of the talks, withheld the information from
general dissemination: only the Prime Minister, Grey, Haldane, Asquith and Ripon
had knowledge of the conversations.
In fact Campbell-Bannerman did inquire of Grey whether he would like ‘the
answer to the French to be confirmed by a Cabinet before it is given?’
But with the Prime Minister still in Scotland Grey was reluctant to commit
himself before discussing the matter personally with Campbell-Bannerman. That
Grey, who admitted to having had no recollection of how he answered this
question, was evidently unsure of himself, may have been as a result of the
influence of Sanderson, a close personal friend. It is important to bear in mind
that the new Foreign Secretary had never been in a Cabinet before.
In such circumstances, being alone in London for most of the month, Grey was
more than ever dependent upon the advice of his Permanent Under-Secretary, and
Sanderson made no secret of his own feelings. It is probable that, as the
sixty-five year old Sanderson’s retirement was imminent (the meeting with
Cambon had been his last official duty), he was more free with his advice than
he might otherwise have been.
When Sanderson saw Cambon on the afternoon of 1 February, to compare the
Ambassador’s version of what had been discussed the previous day with Grey’s
version, Sanderson took the opportunity to place before Cambon his own,
personal, views:
In
the first place, [Sanderson informed Cambon] in the course of my experience,
which was a pretty long one, I knew of no instance of any secret Agreement by
the British Government which pledged them further than that if a certain policy
agreed upon with another Power were in any way menaced, the two Powers should
consult as to the course to be taken. That I thought was the limit to which the
Government could properly bind itself without in some way making Parliament
aware of the obligations that it was incurring. Secondly, it was a maxim which
had been impressed upon me by several statesmen of great eminence that it
was not wise to bring before a Cabinet the question of the course to be pursued
in hypothetical cases which had not arisen. A discussion on the subject
invariably gave rise to divergences of opinion on questions of principle,
whereas in a concrete case unanimity would very likely be secured. M. Cambon
observed that this view was a perfectly just one. Thirdly, I told him that I
thought that if the Cabinet were to give a pledge which would morally bind the
country to go to war in certain circumstances, and were not to mention this
pledge to Parliament, and if at the expiration of some months the country
suddenly found itself pledged to war in consequence of this assurance, the case
would be one which would justify impeachment, and which might even result in
that course unless at the time the feeling of the country were strongly in
favour of the course to which the Government was pledged.
Grey
was particularly pleased that Sanderson’s “maxim” of not presenting the
Cabinet with hypothetical situations was ‘so well pointed out to M. Cambon.’
Presumably, also, Grey took in Sanderson’s final warning; in the circumstances
he might have decided to withhold the subject from the Cabinet in the hope that
the crisis would soon blow over and the pledge would not have to be redeemed.
Besides, Campbell-Bannerman remained resolutely unperturbed by what had
transpired: after all, whatever Grey’s failings in this respect, the final
decision rested with the Prime Minister and Sir Henry showed no inclination to
encourage a broader debate on the subject. No entirely plausible explanation has
been advanced for this omission by Grey and Campbell-Bannerman (which Grey
certainly regretted subsequently) although it has been argued that fear of the
opposition which was bound to be raised around the Cabinet table was a possible
factor.
It would not have done for the first meeting of the new Liberal Cabinet to be at
odds over such an important issue. This was certainly the impression formed by
Cambon, who reported to Paris that, if the matter was brought before the
Cabinet, ‘certain Ministers would be astonished at the opening of official
talks between the military administrations of the two countries and of the
studies which they have worked out in common.’
Whether this was sufficient excuse to withhold the news of the military
conversations is another matter. It also seems clear that, in mitigation, while
Grey over-estimated the nature and extent of the Anglo-French naval
‘conversations’, he did not immediately appreciate the strength of the
commitment entered into by the military authorities.
As promised, Cambon saw Grey again on 31 January to repeat his demand
that British assistance should be forthcoming in the event of an attack by
Germany. At this, Grey immediately referred to the ‘good deal of progress’
that had been made since the last interview on 10 January. ‘Our military and
naval authorities’, Grey emphasized, ‘had been in communication with the
French, and I assumed that all preparations were ready, so that, if a crisis
arose, no time would have been lost for want of a formal engagement.’
This assumption, in relation to the naval talks, was a common thread throughout
Grey’s correspondence that month.
Perhaps, in other circumstances, this omission might eventually have been put
right; however, on the day after the interview with Cambon, when at a meeting of
the C.I.D., Grey received word that his wife had been thrown from a carriage in
Northumberland and was gravely injured. She died three days later, without
regaining consciousness. Grey seriously considered resigning in the face of this
terrible blow but was encouraged by Campbell-Bannerman to stay on; for the
moment, however, all thought of the naval and military conversations was
forgotten.
Prior to this, Grey had written on 15 January: ‘As to taking
precautions beforehand in case war should come, it appears that Fisher has long
ago taken the French Naval attaché in hand and no doubt has all naval plans
prepared.’
Nothing of the sort had occurred. On 2 January, the Attaché in question,
Captain Mercier de Lostende, had paid a diplomatic call on Fisher to invest him
with the Grand Cross of the Légion d’Honneur. Carried away by the occasion,
the British Admiral spoke freely about dispositions (to the Attaché’s evident
delight), as well as boasting that, in a war with England, the Germans would
soon be left without a ship or colony. Grey’s belief that a full exchange had
taken place rested somewhat precariously upon a single sentence: ‘Je suppose
que, à votre côté en France, vous avez pris vos précautions.’
Fisher desired the co-operation of French submarines at Dunkirk with British
submarines at Dover and that was that; he would not even agree to the
preparation of a joint signal code. In all, there ‘was never any real exchange
of views and no definite plan of co-operation in war.’
A garbled account of this discussion was the sole
basis for Grey’s sanguine analysis a fortnight later — this was the solitary
meeting of Entente naval minds; a meeting of more significance for what was left
unsaid. Fisher’s plans, as ever, remained locked in his head.
Clarke was both disappointed at Fisher’s boycott of his informal
conferences and sceptical of Admiralty policy. Fisher’s decision to withdraw
Ottley was not unexpected by Clarke: ‘It is unwise and a pity. No possible
harm can arise from taking reasonable precautions’, he informed Esher on 18
January:
I
know [Clarke continued] you are inclined to think that all will be well as far
as the Admiralty is concerned. I wish I could share this belief…One brain, if
supremely competent, may direct, but it is necessarily quite unable to cope with
complex questions requiring careful thought and study…I also dislike much the
see-saw of responsibility between Fisher and Wilson, and I do not expect that
the former will suddenly assume the responsibility in war, while the latter is a
person full of strong idées fixes which are not all sound by any means…I
think further that if, as is possible, Grierson has been permitted to go further
than is considered wise, there should be all the less reluctance on the part of the Admiralty to play up,
because clearly, one department of state commits all.
Fisher’s
rejection of the developing military Entente alienated the Admiralty from the
C.I.D. The ‘Continental’ strategy of the army was no longer open for
discussion; rather ‘it was a subject to be aired as briefly as possible and
then swept back into the shadows. The result was the drift of the C.I.D. towards
the acceptance of the fait accompli of 1906, without any detailed knowledge or
any serious investigation of the question.’
There were soon signs, however, that Grey began to realize the moral force
that had been created, in part, by the talks. ‘The Entente’,
he argued in February 1906, ‘and still more the constant and emphatic
demonstrations of affection (official, naval, political, commercial Municipal
and in the Press), have created in France a belief that we should support her in
war. The last report from our naval attaché at Toulon said that all the French
officers took this for granted, if the war was between France and Germany about
Morocco. If this expectation is disappointed the French will never forgive
us.’ In an effort to try to avoid war, Grey proposed that some sacrifice
should be made: ‘To do this we should have to find out what compensation
Germany would ask or accept as the price of her recognition of the French claims
in Morocco.’ But, Grey added, ‘it would be necessary to consult the
Admiralty about this, and to find out whether the French would entertain the
idea, and if so what port?’ Grey, personally, favoured allowing the Germans a
port or coaling station in Egypt ‘if that would ensure peace’.
Given his preference for Alexandria over Malta as the base for the British
Mediterranean Fleet, the reaction of Fisher to this idea would have been
fascinating. A German port in Egypt would have allowed ample scope for Fisher to
“Copenhagen” the German Squadron on the threatened outbreak of war. Indeed,
in an attempt to appease Berlin, Grey had been thinking along novel lines since
the start of the year; as he then informed Campbell-Bannerman:
In
more than one part of the world I find signs that Germany is feeling after a
coaling station or port. Everywhere we block this. I am not an expert in naval
strategy, but I doubt whether it is important to us to prevent Germany getting
ports at a distance from her base; and the moment may come when a timely
admission that it is not a cardinal object of British policy to prevent her
having such a port may have a great pacific effect. It may, for instance, turn
out that a port for Germany on the west Atlantic coast of Morocco would solve
all the difficulties of the Morocco Conference and be regarded by the French as
a means of obtaining the recognition which they want in Morocco without
prejudicing their interests in the long run. I cannot yet say that this is
likely to be so, but in view of possibilities I should like to know what is the
real opinion of the Admiralty or Defence Committee on such a point. The
concession of a port to Germany is a card which might any day take a valuable
trick in diplomacy, and the S. of S. for Foreign Affairs ought to know whether
it is a card which it is not inconsistent with British interests for him to
play. Hitherto it has been assumed that all the efforts of British diplomacy
must be used to prevent Germany getting a port anywhere…
As
Grey was later to admit, however, ‘That the possibility of ceding a port to
Germany on the west coast of Morocco should ever have been mentioned is evidence
of how little I was aware of the pitfalls and quaking grounds around me’. Grey
was apparently also unaware that Lansdowne had previously urged the French not
to concede a Moroccan port to Germany; furthermore, the suggestion would never
have been entertained by the Committee of Imperial Defence.
Similarly, the proposal the following month regarding Egypt ran into immediate
opposition from Hardinge.
Faced with resolute opposition, by the spring of 1906 the Germans had
backed down at Algeciras and had been forced to accept a compromise solution. It
did not take long for them to speculate as to the possibility that an
Anglo-French military convention had been concluded, particularly when
‘special facilities and favours’ were granted to Sir John French at the
French manoeuvres; as a result the Kölnische
Zeitung openly surmised as to the existence of a secret convention.
Worse was to follow in Paris in November when a “Nationalist” Senator, M.
Gaudin de Villaine, rose from his seat and challenged the policy of the French
Government. The Senator ‘subjected the President of the Council to a certain
amount of “heckling” ’ by declaring ‘that M. Clemenceau’s
statesmanship consisted of war on the Roman Catholics at home and of an
“English Policy” abroad.’ When Clemenceau retorted that, ‘as to the
latter point, it was impossible to answer anything so vague, M. Gaudin de
Villaine interrupted him saying:— “Is there a military convention between
France and England? Yes or No.” ’ Clemenceau was forced to reply lamely that
he had only been at the Ministry for three weeks; however, of the documents he had
seen, none contained ‘anything of the sort’. When Hardinge became aware of
this incident he declared ‘that it would be awkward if a similar question were
put in Parliament. There is no doubt that the German Gov[ernmen]t are very
anxious for a denial of the existence of a military Convention which many
Germans…believe to have been concluded.’ In Hardinge’s opinion, ‘in view
of the fact that Conferences took place last spring to concert joint measures of
action and that no Convention actually exists’, it would have been better if
Clemenceau had given his tormentor a flat denial. Significantly, however, the
French Ambassador ‘was not quite of the same opinion as he
regards the myth of the existence of a Convention as a deterrent to Germany.’
The incident was certainly a lesson to Grey: ‘It would have been difficult’,
he argued, ‘for M. Clemenceau to deny the existence of a convention without
giving the impression that such a Convention was not desired. I shall endeavour
to avoid a public denial, if I am asked a question.’
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